SELECTED PAPERS OF GENERAL WILLIAM E. DEPUY

Compiled by
Colonel Richard M. Swain



Combat Studies Institute
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

TRADOC
Twentieth Anniversary Commemoration

The First Anniversary of the Founding of the
Gen. William E. DePuy
Chair of Leadership, USACGSC

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SELECTED PAPERS OF GENERAL WILLIAM E. DEPUY

First Commander, U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command, 1 July 1973

Compiled by
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INTRODUCTION

William E. DePuy was likely the most important figure in the recovery of the United States Army from its collapse after the defeat in Vietnam. That is a rather large claim, and it suggests a precedence over a number of other distinguished officers, both his contemporaries and successors. But it is a claim that can be justified by the test of the "null hypothesis": *Could the Army that conducted the Gulf War be imagined without the actions of General DePuy and those he instructed and inspired?* Clearly, it could not. There are few officers of the period about whom one can make the same claim.

To judge properly the accomplishments of General DePuy and his talented subordinates at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), one must understand the sense of crisis and defeat that pervaded the Army in the 1970s. By 1973, the United States had lost the war in Vietnam. Only the most optimistic or naive observer held out hope that the Geneva Accords would provide security for the Republic of South Vietnam. The U.S. Army was in a shambles, with discipline destroyed and the chain of command almost nonexistent. The "All Volunteer Army" was borne on a wave of permissiveness that compounded the problems of restoring discipline. Moreover, the Army was ten years behind its most likely enemy in equipment development, and it had no warfighting doctrine worthy of the name.

The 1973 Middle East War shocked the Army. In the midst of the post-Vietnam trials, the fundamental weakness of the U.S. Army was thrown into sharp relief against the graphic demonstration of the viciousness and cost of modern warfare as conducted on the Golan Heights and in the Sinai. The U.S. Army had to be taught to walk again before it could run, and there were plenty of critics willing to solve the larger, long-range problems before addressing the immediate task of reestablishing the Army's ability to perform the fundamentals of combat. No sophisticated operational task can be accomplished by an army that cannot fight, and there was little evidence in 1973 that the U.S. Army was capable of fighting a first-class enemy. That signal fact, together with the personal experiences General DePuy brought to his newly formed command, are critical to understanding many of the choices made by the Army in the mid-1970s.

With the able assistance of the commandant of the Armor Center, General Donn Starry, General DePuy wrenched the Army from self-pity and recrimination about its defeat in Vietnam into a bruising doctrinal debate that focused the Army's intellectual energies on mechanized warfare against a first-class opponent. Critics might argue correctly that the result was incomplete, but they ought not to underestimate how far the Army had to come just to begin the discussion. AirLand Battle Doctrine would not and could not have existed had the "active defense" not been imposed on the unwilling Army of 1976. Furthermore, given the climate of the mid-1970s, the focus on the Soviet threat across the inter-German border, and the press of ten years of lost time in equipment and intellectual development, the active defense was not a bad place to begin to build. Moreover, it remains to be seen what else but active defense a U.S. mechanized battalion or brigade could have employed in the 1970s against a Soviet breakthrough attack in Europe. Active defense was hardly a comprehensive solution, but it gave the Army a place to begin training while military metaphysicians began to read Clausewitz and Jomini and develop a more comprehensive and general approach to warfighting.

General DePuy also changed the way Army battalions prepared for war. He made the U.S. Army a doctrinal force for the first time in its history. Ably seconded by General Paul Gorman, DePuy led the Army into the age of the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). The ARTEP was founded on no less than a Cartesian approach to combat operations, the idea that any complex battle task could be reduced to a set of precise actions that could be identified and against which the performance of soldiers and units could be evaluated against a standard. This approach was then combined with electronic devices at a piece of almost forgotten desert terrain in California, and the Army was on the way to creating the most effective battalion maneuver trainer in the world—the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California.

The intellectual and training initiatives were joined, then, with a third concern of General DePuy's TRADOC: the development of a set of equipment requirements, with a concentration of effort on a limited number, ultimately called the "Big Five." The result was the suite of weapons that overmatched the Iraqis in Operation Desert Storm—Apache attack helicopters, M1 tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, Patriot air defense missiles, and Black Hawk assault helicopters. In the mid-1970s, describing this equipment—equipment that was two generations removed from that which the Army was familiar—required forecasting a world ten to twelve years in the future and trying to train the Army to be prepared for its arrival. General DePuy championed the recruitment of a high-quality soldiery, an effort beyond his own significant responsibilities but, even so, one he never ceased to support and forward.

But General DePuy was not only a strong and effective commander of a large and complex organization during its early years. What makes him stand out for a historian is his intellectual strength and discipline. He stands apart from his peers as a man of both the sword and the pen. "The trouble with Bill DePuy," a former Pentagon colleague once told me, "was that he never realized how much smarter he was than the rest of us." General DePuy was marked by an unusually perceptive and highly disciplined and robust mind and, it is true, a certain impatience with those who could not keep up with him—and there were many. Unlike many general officers who bark out a few main points and leave the balance of any composition to harried staff officers, General DePuy often would take pen in hand and write much of his own work. The discipline of writing was one he observed most of his life. His papers are marked by an economy of words, precision of expression, and tightness of concept worth preserving and emulating. The power of the mind behind those words retained its influence over the men and women who followed him to the end of his life.

While General DePuy left no autobiography, he guided an autobiographical statement, his oral history, *Changing an Army*, edited by Lieutenant Colonels Romie L. Brownlee and William J. Mullen III, then students at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.[1] This work is a model of what oral history should be. General DePuy was clearly an active participant, and the document was passed between interviewers and subjects until it said precisely what the general intended. The draft transcripts now maintained with General DePuy's papers at the Army's Military History Institute (MHI) are indicative of the team effort involved.

The defining period of General DePuy's professional life was the time he spent in World War II as an infantry officer in the 90th Division. The 90th Division had a bad reputation in the Normandy campaign. Indeed, Omar Bradley considered disbanding the division in light of its poor performance. "In Normandy," DePuy wrote later, "the 90th Division was a killing machine—of our own troops!"[2]

Rising from staff positions to command the 1st Battalion, 357th Infantry, in the 90th, DePuy was wounded twice and decorated for valor four times, receiving the Distinguished Service Cross and three Silver Stars. He ended the war as a twenty-five-year-old infantry battalion commander. Soon after V-E Day, he was appointed division G3. His determination that the U.S. Army not repeat the experience of the 90th Division marked the rest of General DePuy's long and influential career. His interests were many, but he continued to think and write about war at the cutting edge and how he could make the tactical Army more effective.

The collection that follows contains a number of pieces selected precisely because they indicate this fundamental interest in the nature of the tactical fight. The first two entries, "Mission Complete!" and "The Guide to Competence" are training pamphlets written by General DePuy when he commanded the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, in 1954. These pamphlets, written after both his wartime battalion command and two years of testing infantry units in Germany and Austria, laid the foundation for General DePuy's simplified battle drills. He refined the ideas developed in these years in a March 1958 essay, "11 Men 1 Mind," published in *Army* magazine.

The article "11 Men 1 Mind" is one of General DePuy's seminal works. Aside from introducing a common sense approach to battle drills (traveling, overwatch, and bounding overwatch), the author provides a concept of the infantry squad that is unique in its explicit statement of the centrality of submerging individual consciousness into a practical group identity. DePuy recognized an often overlooked truth that the infantry squad, composed of independent thinking men, is in fact one of the most complex organizations in war, one that deserves its own theoretical frame of reference. He called the squad "an idea shared by a group of men" and emphasized the central importance of a common purpose uniting these independent players into a team. The essay was in fact a critique of the highly stylized minor tactics then contemporary, a tactical formalism that survived well into the period of the war in Vietnam.

Years later, in 1988, General DePuy would write a second essay of equal importance, "Concept of Operations: The Heart of Command, the Tool of Doctrine." This essay was also published in *Army* and like "11 Men 1 Mind" emphasized the importance of sustaining a common idea throughout any complex organization—be it the infantry squad or a fighting corps. The central problem now was the complexity of the task. Combat, General DePuy concluded, had become very complex precisely because of "the multiplication of battlefield functions." He showed this expansion in a figure that suggested that the eleven principal battle functions of Clausewitz' day had become thirty by the day of AirLand Battle. To harmonize the functions, he provided both the intellectual device—a well understood set of "nested" concepts—and a mechanical tool—the "synchronization matrix"—a device suggested in a 1984 *Army* essay, "Toward a Balanced Doctrine."

General DePuy's concern for the complexity of the battlefield and the need to harmonize the elements of combat power to achieve tactical synergy remained with him to the end of his life. In his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in December 1990, he attempted once more to convey the difficulty of battlefield synchronization to those who had never been confronted with the task. Sadly, they seemed not to understand. Nonetheless, in the Army headquarters of the Gulf War, the synchronization matrix was a ubiquitous planning tool, perhaps the most practical physical evidence of the direct intellectual influence General DePuy exercised over the Army that fought in Desert Storm.

General DePuy had gained his earliest appreciation for battlefield complexity and the consequent need for synchronization of systems as a battalion commander in the 90th Division. In his discussion of World War II combat in his oral history, he made clear that what he came to call *synchronization* did not mean an abandonment of maneuver.[3] Rather, it was the skillful and timely use of all available fire resources to *enable* maneuver. In the case of World War II combat, the response to complexity involved the use of suppressive fires from both organic direct and supporting indirect fire systems. These ideas were reinforced in the late 1950s and early 1960s when he commanded a battle group in Germany. Later, in Vietnam, he elevated the idea to the division. He skillfully coordinated all combat and combat support systems horizontally and vertically to enable him to respond to contact with the elusive enemy immediately upon location.[4]

Ultimately, he found the highest expression of this idea in the Israeli experience in Lebanon. Here, synchronization was raised to the level of an Army's relentless attack. General DePuy described this most effectively in a book review of Chris Bellamy's *The Future of Land Warfare*, published in *Parameters* in December 1987. He compared, unfavorably, the early 1980s fascination with the metaphysics of *Auftragstaktik* and Israeli practice in the Bekaa Valley. To anyone reading both "The Concept of Operations" and the *Parameters* review, it is clear that synchronization was a necessary preliminary to creative execution—not a rigid substitute for imagination. The common concept would provide purpose and direction; synchronized actions—discipline and simple well-understood battle drills—would create a more effective whole. The "Concept of Operations" article expanded on the "11 Men 1 Mind" article, emphasizing in the most pronounced manner the centrality of the governing idea in cooperative warfighting.

The Israeli experience influenced General DePuy's writing from the time he arrived at TRADOC until he died. It is not surprising that it did. The U.S. Army came out of Vietnam dispirited and lacking focus. It expended a great deal of energy adapting to an all-volunteer force as conscription became a late casualty of an unpopular war. At the same time, it was apparent to any who thought about it that the Army's future was not in direct involvement in rural insurgencies. The immediate strategic problem was the Soviet threat to Western Europe that had intensified while U.S. energies were directed elsewhere. War in Europe, should it come, would involve heavy combat by mechanized and armored forces, with the NATO allies at a great numerical disadvantage.

Just as this began to become clear, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War occurred and provided what seemed to be a metaphor for the NATO tactical problem: forward defense on a high-technology battlefield by an outnumbered force. Almost immediately, General DePuy, now commanding the new Training and Doctrine Command, began a detailed study of the Israeli experience. References to the Israelis run through his papers. The best summary of what he believed was to be learned from this conflict can be found in the briefing he gave around the Army, "Implications of the Middle East War on U.S. Army Tactics, Doctrine and Systems." The edition of that briefing found here is undated, but it is printed with the 1974 selections that address the TRADOC study upon which it was founded and the early conclusions drawn from TRADOC's study of the Israeli experience.

The external influence on General DePuy second only to that of the Israelis was the German one. There were two reasons for this. First of all, the Germans had fought the Soviet armies thirty years earlier, and many veterans of those battles remained alive and active. General DePuy

retained a life-long respect for the professional skill of his World War II enemies. Second, the new American doctrine had to satisfy those who provided the largest army on the central front in Europe. Reference to German expertise and concern for the compatibility of U.S. and German doctrine mark the General's letters in the 1970s.

Unlike General DePuy's published papers, whose selection was fairly easy, the official papers from General DePuy's tenure as founding commander of TRADOC required a certain amount of discretion. In that regard, this volume represents an attempt to collect under one cover selected documents that address the general's principal concerns and that seemed, for one reason or another, to have his "finger-prints" on them (recognizing that general officers have around them a number of people to compose their epistles). Some of the selections were obvious. No collection would be complete without the famous "Pot of Soup" letter of July 1974 that solicited the views of the various Army "communities" on warfighting. An identical letter was sent to each school commandant, initiating the undertaking of doctrinal reform. The "Draft Concept Paper" that accompanied the letter follows, though there is no way from the archives to tell if it is the edition that first went out. A number of the documents were easy to identify as the general's. These were handwritten on yellow legal pads and generally show both the date and "Highfield," the DePuy home in Virginia.

General DePuy concerned himself with all aspects of Army training. He even gave his name to a foxhole designed with a frontal cover and described it in great detail. He personally wrote portions of the 1976 FM 100-5 and, having published it, set out to sell it and observe it in the field. In this regard, he was fortunate in the promotion of General Starry to command of V Corps in Europe. Starry became the "outside man" in the partnership. He tried the new doctrine in the field and learned from that experience. When he succeeded to the command of TRADOC, he was the principal overseer of a new FM 100-5, published in 1982. This manual was significantly different from its predecessor, but it was, in fact, built upon what Starry had learned and what he had heard, read, and thought in the intervening period. General DePuy took part in the debate over the new manual, commenting on the criticism of the 1976 doctrine in an *Army* article published in 1980.

Naturally, the TRADOC commander addressed himself to officer education. As DePuy neared the end of his career, he wrote a letter to General Rogers in May 1977 that began: "This may be the most important letter I have written to you. It has to do with training the officer corps." In this letter, he laid a foundation for a progressive and sequential officer training program focused primarily on mastery of the skills necessary to succeed at the next operational level to which an officer could expect to be assigned. This view of officer education is one that had guided his tenure at TRADOC, and though the view did not survive his period of command, it is one worth considering.

The balance between training and education is always tenuous in Army schools. General DePuy believed that broad-based programs training an officer to assume positions two levels up might be appropriate for a mobilization-based Army. "But," he said later, "we don't have a Mobilization Army; we have an 800,000 man Army! That's what we are going to war with. Why should we go to war with untrained platoon leaders, untrained company commanders, and untrained battalion commanders, when they have to win the first battle?"[5] Once more, the combined influence of the Israelis and his own World War II experiences are evident. In the decade that followed, the various training initiatives that General DePuy and General Gorman

began, particularly the National Training Center, would permit a return to broader-based and higher-level school curriculum, at least in the Command and General Staff College. But by the 1980s, many things were different. The sense of crisis that marked the Army in the 1970s had subsided. Military funding was restored. The volunteer Army began to work, and both discipline and confidence returned to the Army that, in turn, was returning to the field for tough, demanding training in operational units.

Following his retirement from the Army in 1977, General DePuy remained an active participant in the Army's intellectual life. He continued to take an interest in the Army's doctrinal development, publicly, as in the pages of *Army* magazine, and informally, as a "gray beard," consulted often by his successors. He took an active and very paternal interest in the School of Advanced Military Studies at the Command and General Staff College. He visited it often and advised both students and faculty as they attempted to address changing requirements of doctrine and military theory.

General DePuy testified before Congress, notably on joint service, a subject about which he had expressed an interest as early as 1961 ("Unification: How Much More?") and, as noted, before the Gulf War. At the time of his final illness, he was beginning to think about the requirements for the post-Gulf War military and the requirements for joint doctrine.

In retirement, General DePuy reflected on his experience in Vietnam. He had served both as General Westmoreland's operations officer (J3) during the period of large-scale U.S. commitment of forces and as commander of the 1st Infantry Division. It is instructive to compare the views he put forward in a 1967 presentation to a War College audience and the lessons he later extracted after having reflected on the period in light of the war's outcome. In neither case was his analysis facile or vindictive. General DePuy continued to serve the Army and nation as a distinguished elder statesman whose contribution to the service began on the eve of World War II and continued until his death in 1992.

In the seventeen years between General DePuy's creation of TRADOC and the beginning of the Gulf War, the Army never stood still. Many of the decisions taken by General DePuy were later modified as conditions changed and opinions shifted. Doctrine became more comprehensive and sophisticated. Military education broadened. Training methodologies grew, and the "Big Five" were fielded and improved. The Army DePuy built did not fight the Soviet Army in Europe but, before being demobilized, proved its capability on another battlefield in the Gulf War.

The DePuy legacy remains as an attitude toward hard training and readiness for battle. It remains in a consciousness, now institutionalized, that doctrine must remain a living codification of coherent beliefs about warfighting, a body of beliefs that evolve as conditions change. General DePuy is also survived by a legacy of hard, robust thinking and precise, disciplined writing that can serve as a model for his successors who will deal with different challenges, though ones no less in need of sound analysis and decision.

General DePuy was a long-time contributor to *Army* magazine. The Association of the United States Army has granted its permission to reprint General DePuy's many articles in this collection. The *Marine Corps Gazette* has permitted the reprinting of his review of John P. Rose's *The Evolution of U.S. Army Nuclear Doctrine* (Boulder, Colorado, 1980). Colonel Robert C. Hughes, USAF, of the National War College, provided assistance in obtaining clearance of a Vietnam-era transcript, thus permitting it to be included in this collection.

There are two large collections of the general's official papers. One is at the TRADOC History Office at Fort Monroe, Virginia. The other is located at the Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The author enjoyed the unqualified support of Dr. H. O. Malone, the TRADOC command historian, and Dr. John Romjue of the TRADOC History Office, in examining the TRADOC records. Dr. Richard Sommers, the director of the archives at MHI (Carlisle Barracks), and his staff were equally forthcoming with advice and support. It is unlikely that there is a more congenial archive in which a researcher can work than that at MHI. I am also indebted to Robin H. Inojos and Edward J. Carr, visual information specialists, and Alfred T. Dulin, Graphics supervisor, Training Support Center, for their layout and coordination of the manuscript.

Most of all, I wish to thank Mr. William E. DePuy, Jr., to whom I raised the possibility of assembling such a collection at the time of General DePuy's induction into the Fort Leavenworth Hall of Fame. Bill, Jr., has been extraordinarily supportive of my efforts, providing counsel, encouragement, and in many cases papers from his own collection. The DePuy mind and sense of humor are obviously hereditary, and the opportunity to work with Bill has been the greatest reward of this effort.

General William E. DePuy deserves a full biography. Such a book would be the best chronicle of the U.S. Army's journey from Saigon to Safwan. That task, however, awaits more skilled hands than mine. Until such a book is forthcoming, it is hoped that this collection of papers, together with the Military History Institute's oral history, will preserve for the future the memory of this most remarkable soldier.

NOTES

1. Lieutenant Colonel Romie L. Brownlee and Lieutenant Colonel William J. Mullen III, *Changing an Army: An Oral History of General William E. DePuy, USA Retired* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Military History Institute, 1979).

2. Ibid., 202.

3. Ibid., 84–87.

4. Ibid., 148–49.

5. Ibid., 183.

I. PRE-TRADOC YEARS

1

MISSION COMPLETE!
[Platoon Battle Drill, 1954]





Provided by William E. DePuy, Jr.

1. The technique of platoon battle drill as outlined in this booklet was developed for the following reasons:

a. It fills the gap between the theories, as published in the field manuals, and the actual battlefield application of those theories.

b. The technique lends itself well to extended order drill.

2. This booklet does not change the organization of squads in any manner. The permanent division of squads into two teams remains constant thereby reducing the requirement for battlefield explanation and eliminating the requirement for continual squad reorganization within the platoon.

3. The methods of moving the platoon and the formations for this movement under combat and simulated combat conditions will be as outlined in the following pages of this booklet.

A rifle platoon has three techniques of movement.

a. Traveling (contact with enemy not expected. Platoon moving as part of larger formation not leading or flanking.



b. Traveling Overwatch (Contact with enemy unlikely but possible. Leading or flanking larger formation or moving independently enemy situation unknown.



c. Bounding Overwatch (Contact with the enemy momentarily probable. Late stage of approach to known or suspected enemy locations.)

This technique does not lend itself to diagramming owing to the number of movements involved.

At least one rifle squad and one LMG are in stationary overwatching positions at all times. The foremost advancing rifle squad moves in a traveling overwatch to the next stationary position designated by the platoon leader. Squads rotate smoothly and rapidly through the three roles- advancing-overwatching-and returning to rear of column and following.

Flank protection may ordinarily be provided by proper selection of stationary overwatches. Properly executed this technique provides:
- immediate retaliatory fire of one squad and one LMG
- a ready reserve of one rifle squad
- a minimum force (the foremost advancing squad) engaged on ground selected by, and favorable to, the enemy.

The platoon has three principle techniques for the attack:

a. Fire and Movement (leapfrogging). (in broken terrain)

This technique is similar to the bounding overwatch with the stationary squads delivering covering fire for the advancing squads. Routes forward for advancing squads are selected more carefully for cover and stationary positions are selected more carefully for concealment and cover and access by fire to the then, known enemy positions.



B. Fire and Movement (lawnmower) (in open, coverless terrain).

When a platoon must attack over open terrain without cover and little concealment, it must do so by rapid fire and movement. The most suitable technique is a line of squads with all A teams advancing while B teams fire and vice versa in rapid succession until assaulting distance is reached! One LMG is with the A teams the other with the B teams.

c. The Assault

The assault is a line of squads with teams on line-center squad base squad--A teams base teams. LMG's fire from stationary positions when possible and when not accompany the assault.

2

THE GUIDE TO COMPETENCE
[Rifle Squad Battle Drill, 1954]



The Guide to Competence

W. E. DePuy

Provided by William E. DePuy, Jr.

RIFLE SQUAD BATTLE DRILL

1. The theory and technique of squad battle drill as set forth in this booklet is based on the following facts:

a. When the immediate application of the squad's maximum fire fails to destroy the enemy, the squad advances by fire and maneuver.

b. The squad first MUST establish fire superiority.

c. Fire superiority is gained and maintained by keeping the enemy under heavy and accurate fire so that his fire is ineffective.

d. Until supporting weapons or other units can gain and maintain fire superiority without assistance from the squad, members of the squad must fire. Here the automatic rifle can do much to produce the desired effect.

e. In the execution of separate missions such as point of advance guard, patrols, flank security or independent attack, a rifle squad must organize into at least two elements.

f. The average squad for training or combat numbers 4,5 or 6 men. Organization of the squad into the two required teams is simply a matter of dividing the squad in half.

g. One of these two elements or teams advances while the second overwatches and/or delivers covering fire. By this combination of fire and maneuver the squad advances to the assault

position.

2. A squad leader, two BAR's and an assistant squad leader fall naturally into two teams. The first or A team is commanded by the squad leader and consists of one BAR and one or more riflemen depending on the size of the squad. The second or B team is commanded by the assistant squad leader and consists of a BAR and one or more riflemen again depending on the size of the squad. Teams may function effectively with as few as two men and as many as 4 or 5. The average teams consist of 3 men.

3. The methods of moving the squad and the formations for this movement under combat and simulated combat conditions will be as outlined in the following pages of this booklet.

4. Arm and hand signals to be employed during squad training are as follows:

a. Traveling - the standard FOLLOW ME signal as outlined in FM 21-60.

b. Traveling Overwatch - the standard FOLLOW ME signal followed by a Double Time Signal as outlined in FM 21-60.

c. Bounding Overwatch - the standard COVER OUR ADVANCE followed by a Double Time Signal as outlined in FM 21-60.

d. Overwatch Fire & Movement - arm extended, moved in a circular manner. Right arm indicates "B" team move to the right, left arm indicates "B" team move to the left.

A rifle squad has three principle techniques of movement.

a. Traveling (Contact with enemy not expected - squad moving as part of platoon - not leading or flanking.



b. Traveling overwatch (Contact with enemy possible but unlikely. Squad as point, squad as flank protection - early stages of patrol or independent mission - speed essential.



C. Bounding overwatch

(Contact with enemy momentarily likely)
Late stages of patrol - enemy location generally but not specifically known.

Squad leader signals B team forward when he reaches point where overwatch becomes ineffective or 100 yds forward, whichever occurs first.

B team overwatching from stationary firing position selected by squad leader. Squad leader simply points to general position of overwatch and B team leader disposes team to accomplish mission.
While B team is moving up squad leader points rifle in direction most plausible enemy positions overwatching in that direction.



A rifle squad has two techniques for the attack.

a. Fire and Movement (leapfrogging)

This technique is similar to the bounding overwatch with the stationary team engaging the enemy with covering fire and the advancing team taking greater advantage of covered routes forward.

Notes: a. Routes ① ② ③ & ④ are covered.

b. Firing Positions 1 2 3 are carefully but rapidly selected for concealment and cover plus access by fire to the hostile position.



b. The Assault

The B Team comes abreast of and guides on the A Team during the assault.



3

11 MEN 1 MIND

You can't see an infantry squad—it is an idea that exists only when jointly held by its members.

COLONEL WILLIAM E. DePUY

The more startling become the scientific advances of this most startling period of history the more necessary it is to protect the lands wherein the scientists work. The more fantastic become the vehicles of interstellar space, the more precious are the areas from which they are launched and the natural resources from which they are fabricated.

No, Mr. Infantryman, you are not obsolete—you have never been more relevant to your country's need, nor more important to its future. For no one yet has discovered how to acquire or defend land areas without you.

Constant efforts to improve your ground fighting techniques are therefore necessary and you should proceed with this without apology to the missile and atom men for you are not in conflict with their purposes. You are simply at work on another part of the same huge problem of survival.

There is a tendency to misunderstand the fundamentals of war these days. There are people who are apparently convinced that nuclear firepower has replaced manpower and therefore Army forces are obsolete. Now it would be foolish, indeed, to forego the power of the most modern weapons. But the nuclear-weapons-will-do-it-alone theorists are out of contact with reality. Their ideas simply do not engage with the facts of warfare as they exist. Military targets for nuclear weapons will only form when attacking ground forces pile up against the barrier of defending ground forces or when they voluntarily mass to force a breach of those defending forces. Without a defense on the ground, nuclear weapons, whether delivered by aircraft or missiles, will not find targets, and like a hammer without an anvil will strike ineffectively.

This country must always be able to fight on the ground and stand up man to man against its enemies. To the infantry small-unit leader the larger strategic situation is a matter of complete indifference. He lives in a small world of attack and defense which is all his own. The larger aspects of battle are the concern of others. Missiles may fly and nuclear weapons thunder but so long as he lives he must fight on about the same terms as his ancestors—man against man—where the fire of courage and the coolness of competence mark the victor.

Theory and practice of the rifle squad

There is much reason then to concern ourselves with the theory and practice of training and fighting a rifle squad. Oddly enough, very little has ever been written upon this subject. Field

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manuals devote a page or two to the fighting of the squad and thousands of pages to the organization and techniques of higher formations, many of which exist only to get the squad into contact and support it there. Perhaps this is because the squad is thought to be a small and simple command about which there is just not much to say. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The squad is perhaps the most challenging of all combat commands because it is the only military organization which is comprised of *men*, not *units*. All commanders above the squad learn how to employ units. The commander of a squad must learn how to employ men.

Soldiers who work with cannons and tanks, or aircraft or ships, sometimes find it difficult to appreciate the vast difference in the problem which faces the soldier who works with men—not equipment. Sometimes, like the air we breathe, we overlook that which lies too near at hand. That which is a part of us is not so easy to see and seldom noted. The command and motivations of men in peace or war within the military service and outside are a problem in mental imagery—a problem in abstractions. The leader has a scheme which he must transmit by word of mouth, to create a facsimile of his scheme in the *minds* of his subordinates. We do this every day. This is the stuff of which all human intercourse is made. What raises this commonplace process to a critical consideration in infantry combat is the absence of an orthodox function and the general lack of mechanical substitutes for purely human organization.

For contrast let us consider for a moment the howitzer and crew. The howitzer itself is the concrete expression and permanent embodiment of a common purpose. Rain or shine, day or night, the howitzer stands unchanged. It is served in battle by men who relate their activities to it, and mobilize their energies around it. The howitzer is functional, constant, central and immutable. So is a destroyer and so is a bomber. The physical presence of a machine of war provides continuity of purpose and ties the energies and activities of the human crew into the performance of a military function.

Figment of the mind

On the other hand, what do we find in a rifle squad? A squad is an organizational idea jointly held by its members. It does not exist physically—you can't see a squad—you can only see the individuals who man it. To illustrate this point, it is impossible to distinguish a trained squad from a random collection of individuals if both groups are equal in number, similarly equipped and standing idle alongside a road. The difference is lying quietly hidden in their minds. Furthermore, even a trained squad ceases to exist whenever its members revert to the normal human state of egocentricity.

Only when the members of the squad are thinking jointly on one problem may they properly be called a squad. Here, then, is the great overwhelming feature which distinguishes the rifle squad from the gun, tank, plane, or ship's crew. A squad is an idea shared by a group of men. Unlike the steel of a tank an idea is ephemeral—fragile—fleeting. Thus it is that the hardest fighting known to man—the personal face-to-face grubbing and killing of the infantryman—is prosecuted with the most sophisticated, least standardized, most unpredictable and least understood of all of the tools of war—the human mind.

The sergeant wonders why his squad seems to be wandering aimlessly around the hillside instead of attacking according to his plan. The reason—the sergeant's plan is in *his* head, not in theirs. His squad is proceeding on many divergent assumptions in the absence of simple complete

instructions on the basis of which they could act in concert. The sergeant issues an order to move across a field. The ten men hear—obey—become a squad momentarily. Halfway across the open field they are fired upon. The sergeant's orders provide no basis for a response to this new situation so the squad disintegrates and becomes ten separate frightened men thinking about themselves. A squad is here this moment, gone the next. It congeals around a common purpose, fully understood, and it melts away in the presence of uncertainty, confusion, or the absence of direction. Unfortunately, the battlefield produces a great number of egocentric reactions which are destructive of mental images. Fear, hunger, pain, and fatigue all cause a man to think of himself. While he is thinking of himself he becomes wholly an individual and is not mentally, for that time at least, a member of the squad. Thus, the environment of the battlefield is conducive to the disintegration of the squad, not its cohesion.

The commander of a squad is constantly faced with two supremely important tasks:

First, he must decide on a course of squad action which will achieve his objectives, and

Second , he must organize his squad around a jointly held image of this course of action in sufficient detail to provide adequate instructions for each squad member.

As if this requirement were not challenging enough, the average squad leader suffers under a number of additional handicaps. He usually commands men who are not the most imaginative members of the military establishment—in other words, men who are not as fast with an abstraction as their former colleagues who have been promoted or assigned technical or administrative jobs. Also, the squad leader must practice his art only after his mind is numbed with fatigue and fright, his body weakened by hunger and exposure, and the receptiveness of his squad partially dulled by casualties. Add to this the fact that battlefields are noisy and otherwise distracting and you have set up a requirement to try the mettle of any man.

For all of these reasons, both theoretical and practical, most squads are poorly commanded, if at all. Only too often in training, inept squad leaders exhort their men during an attack with such pseudo-commands as "*fire and movement*" or "*keep it moving, men.*" No soldier has ever heard the command "*fire and movement*" on the field of battle and no man alive gets a very useful picture in his mind from such a command.

In fact, on the field of battle this kind of squad leaderusually does—nothing. A soldier who risks his life deserves as a minimum to know generally what it is that he is expected to do.

The organizational solution

One would seem to be justified in guessing that the recent organization of the rifle squad into two teams was prompted by an urge to substitute the simplicity of organization for the uncertainty of human behavior. The Army is at home and at ease with the relations between units and commanders and so another echelon has been added to regularize and simplify the working of the rifle squad. If the team is to be treated as an independent command and sent out to perform separate functions, then the new organization would serve only to push the basic problem one more notch down the stick but would do nothing toward solving it. As seems more likely, however, the squad itself will be the smallest unit expected to perform an independent mission, and the teams will always be in close functional relationship with each other. This is good, and

if fully understood and properly used, should increase the effectiveness of the U. S. infantry by a factor of several hundred per cent.

The new squad organization only makes sense in relation to the battle drill which it makes possible. It is well to reflect for a moment upon the fundamental virtues of this battle drill. It is not because the battle drill as such is necessarily the best way to fight in any one situation but rather because a battle drill based on a squad organized into two mutually supporting teams serves to articulate organizationally the basic mental framework with which the squad leader must work. It automatically provides the fundamentals of the squad's organization for any particular task. *Battle drill reduces by a large factor the necessity for battlefield explanation.*

Mechanical function that takes much heart

It is no longer necessary for the squad leader to organize his squad into functional elements (fire-maneuver) each time he issues an order. The battle drill is an operational SOP. Like any SOP it takes the place of certain orders which otherwise must be issued again and again. In the case of a squad it constitutes an "understanding" which tends to congeal the squad into an organization. It does not tell the squad leader how to fight but it gives him the basic organization with which to fight. Considering the difficulties under which he must operate we must instinctively favor any device which will cut down his task to manageable proportions.

By rehearsals and drills the soldier comes to know and expect that his team fires when the other team moves, and vice versa. However, he must be told *where* to move and *when to fire*, for battle drill cannot do this.

Let us go deeply into the application of the battle drill to the squad leader's actual problems of command. Infantry fighting is a mechanical function even though much heart is involved. It has two chief requirements—to kill and to advance. A technique or a maneuver which does not contribute to one or the other of those functions is superfluous. A squad spends more than ninety per cent of its time moving and less than ten per cent fighting. On this basis alone it is important to develop the best techniques for moving.

The squad moves under three general situations:

- It simply travels from point A to B *without concern* for the enemy (as part of a larger unit, etc.).
- It travels toward the enemy with the *chances of contact remote* but barely possible (some precautionary measures are justified but speed is desirable).
- It travels toward contact, *expecting to encounter enemy resistance at any moment.*

If a rifle squad can do these three things well it can do the vast majority of its offensive chores well. In case the function to be performed is to move, the simplest way to move is to have team Bravo follow team Alfa without interval. This could be called the TRAVELING FORMATION and—all other things being equal and in the absence of instructions to the contrary—this should be the normal formation for the squad.

If the squad has been sent on flanking duty or on patrol to investigate a farm, a village, a copse of trees, or a ridge line, and if contact does not seem imminent but possible, then the function to

be performed is to move in a formation which will not decrease speed but which will provide an opportunity to react and give the squad some protection if it unexpectedly runs into enemy fire. The easiest standard solution to this problem is to drop Bravo team back fifty yards (just outside the beaten zone of fire directed at Alfa team) with a mission of following Alfa prepared to deliver retaliatory fire at any enemy force which engages Alfa. Stealing a word from armor, this role could be best described as a TRAVELING OVERWATCH.

The last situation in which contact is expected momentarily calls for Bravo team to conduct its "overwatch" from successive, carefully selected positions with team members prone in firing position from which they could engage the most likely enemy positions. This technique would logically be termed a BOUNDING OVERWATCH.

The squad must also be prepared to fire and move in the attack. This function may be performed by the alternative FORWARD MOVEMENT and delivery of OVERWATCH FIRE by the two teams in a consecutive fashion. This may sound like an oversimplification of the attack but without bringing in the enemy and the terrain it covers all the relevant principles both organizational and operational. Everything else the squad does is less complicated and need not be discussed.



TRAVELING FORMATION

Team BRAVO follows Team ALFA without interval. There are ten yards between men.

These techniques are functional. Any technique which further complicates the performance of these functions is unnecessary and of doubtful merit. For example, there is no apparent functional purpose of any real moment for the diamond formation or the squad wedge.

The introduction of the two teams in a squad passes some of the harder problems on down to the team leader. However, his task is greatly simplified by the fact that the main decisions are made for him and the function of his team is usually clear and unambiguous. He either fires or he moves or he is preparing to fire. In a sense he inherits the command problem in miniature because now he is the only man in the whole chain of command who in the strictest sense commands men instead of units.



TRAVELING OVERWATCH

Team BRAVO follows Team ALFA at an interval of fifty to seventy-five yards in open terrain and twenty-five to thirty yards in woods or bush.

The quality of leadership at this level may be expected to be of such a nature that physical demonstration must inevitably be a main technique. "Follow me and do as I do" may often be the extent of instructions offered. This is not ideal but it is a comprehensive and durable instruction. The most effective team leaders will do more and John Doe will be told where to move and where to fire. Under heavy fire when reluctance to follow general instructions will increase, the team leaders must be specific or their teams will fail to function.

It is extremely doubtful that very many American soldiers have ever given their lives for their country in response to hand or arm signals. The use of such signals should be reexamined. The distant wave of the hand is too cryptic, too vague, too impersonal, and probably too passive to produce a movement forward.

Notwithstanding some American mythology to the contrary, there is very little initiative demonstrated on a battlefield. When the bullets start to fly the average man lies low. He stays that way until he is ordered to do otherwise. For example, the main difference between green and veteran units is that in green units it is customary for everyone to lie low waiting for the others to get up and do spontaneously what they have been trained to do for so long, and what our folklore tells us they will surely do—and this is often a long wait. In the veteran unit some man, who has learned the hard way that nothing happens unless someone takes measures of some sort, looks a few soldiers straight in the eye and orders them personally and individually to do some very specific task like "Move up to that hedgerow"—"Throw a grenade in that window"—"Cross that field"—"Fire at that house." Lacking such orders the soldier does what comes naturally—nothing.

There is an interesting thought buried in this subject. This waiting for the soldier's



BOUNDING OVERWATCH

When contact with the enemy is expected the squad's teams make alternate movements. Team ALFA moves forward under cover of the fire of Team BRAVO which is in an overwatching position. At the end of its advance,Team ALFA takes an overwatching position and covers the forward movement of Team BRAVO to its next overwatching position. Thus the squad moves forward in short, protected rushes.

initiative to display itself on the battlefield is consistent with the legends of Lexington and Concord but not with the basic premise on which the system of military discipline is founded. The system of Army discipline is presumably built upon the rationale that instinctive automatic obedience is required on the field of battle. This principle should be applied right down to the last man. But the concomitant requirement is that the superior of this last man must issue the orders which the last man is expected to obey instinctively. Here is the traditional weakness. Of

course the system is justified and essential in spite of this tendency to discard it at the cutting edge. A process of natural selection partially offsets this tendency in combat.

It is a source of amazement to some training specialists that veteran divisions can fight so well with little or no formal training in infantry combat. The single characteristic which differentiates veteran infantry units from green ones is the predominance throughout the ranks of *dominant* leaders. These men are not always polite—they are usually impatient and always self-assured. They are seldom impressed with the amount of initiative they find lying around loose. They know what they want—they issue orders to that effect and see that they are carried out. Whereas most men will not accept risks voluntarily, very few men have the courage to refuse to obey a commander who looks them in the eye and says "Take Smith and Jones and go in that house and clean it out," or "Peterson, fire a clip at the corner of those woods."

In good and battle-tested units, just as in good baseball teams, there is always a lot of chatter. This chatter is the process of continually revising, adding to and strengthening the mental picture of the developing operations. The Germans, who are competent infantrymen, to say the least, are noisy fighters. Hans and Fritz get lots of instruction from Wolfgang the Feldwebel during the attack—where to move or where to shoot.

The bulk of the fighting is always done by a handful of men who view fighting as a practical matter. They use no signals or magic words. They talk it over—decide who will do what and get on with it.

Finding the leaders

In these days of perpetual readiness we are faced with the problem of training leaders who are ready to go now. We do not have the natural selection of combat at our disposal. We must look for dominant personalities and put them in command. We must tell our squad and team leaders that they must become articulate—build word pictures—issue specific unmistakable instructions. Nothing is to be left to chance or doubt.

Few squad leaders are Doctors of Philosophy—some are more articulate than others, but prudence suggests that we simplify their tasks as much as possible and this is where the battle drill and the team system relieve the squad leader of at least half of his requirement for battlefield explanation. Those who claim that this deprives him of his prerogatives underestimate the size of the problem which remains to confront him. To decide—under fire—where the enemy is—how to approach him—how to use the terrain—how to control his teams—inspire his men—and how to keep the squad's mental picture alive is challenge enough for any man.

4

THE CASE FOR A DUAL CAPABILITY

"If you jump towards Bradley you are haunted by Collins, and if you side with Collins who is to explain away Bradley?"—A thoughtful and penetrating analysis of an important debate appearing in two recent issues of this magazine

Colonel WILLIAM E. DePUY

In two recent issues of ARMY, two distinguished soldiers have argued opposite sides of a critical and vexing problem—should the Army emphasize *nuclear* or *conventional* weapons? In the October issue, Colonel Francis X. Bradley argued essentially that "We must go nuclear." Colonel Arthur S. Collins in the November issue stated: "I don't believe that anything worthwhile or meaningful can result from the employment of nuclear weapons in war."

Of course, neither of the authors would pretend that the matter is as black and white as each painted it. There are many complications, reservations, and qualifications in both articles which bring them closer together than the titles or these quotations would suggest. Additionally, it seems likely that Colonel Bradley is thinking in terms of bigger weapons and bigger wars while Colonel Collins is presumably thinking chiefly in terms of smaller wars and issues and less direct involvement of the two main centers of power. Nonetheless the net effect of the two articles is to throw doubt upon the validity of the so-called dual concept which the Army now embraces. Colonel Bradley is explicit on this point: ". . . I cannot understand why we continue to talk about the need for a dual capability, and why we try to plan for two separate types of war." Colonel Collins is hardly less direct: "If one studies the host of problems that the atomic weapon brings to the battlefield—the blowdown, craters, contamination, flash blindness—then one can ask, is it really worth it?"

This puts the concept of dual-capability squarely on the spot. It is my purpose here to suggest that the Army has acted wisely and that on balance it is following the only sensible course, a course which, where it suffers at all, suffers from too thin a diet of resources. Additionally I will say a word about the practical problem of achieving a proper balance between nuclear and conventional capabilities within a reasonable organizational framework.

But let us take these up one at a time.

Both authors seem to be urging us toward a choice—a clear decisive move—one way or the other. This is understandable. There is probably not one of us who has not wanted to make such a choice on a number of occasions, especially when our minds are exhausted and our spirit weakened from struggling too long with these matters which don't resolve into simple or even

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single answers. But the trouble with this choice is that if you jump toward Bradley you are haunted by Collins, and if you side with Collins, who is to explain away Bradley?

Lining up courses of action and then picking the one which seems to have the edge in advantages and the fewest disadvantages is an old military technique, but it presupposes the existence of genuine alternatives. However, in the case of nuclear and conventional capabilities no choice exists because we are not dealing with mutually exclusive alternatives but rather with separate necessities.

A man might carefully analyze his fire and theft insurance and decide, on balance, that theft insurance is the better buy. He can, by this method, choose his means of defense but sadly enough he has no control over the threat to his property which in this case remains both fire and theft no matter what decision he makes. Nations, like householders, if they have their wits about them, don't operate that way.

We are faced with an atomic threat and a conventional threat. It is grossly wrong to suggest that we have a choice between them, and by so doing suggest that we turn our backs upon certain aspects of the Soviet threat which may, in fact, do us in.

There is a long standing tendency in this country to view the problem of a proper defense very much from an egocentric point of view—that is, to favor those actions which are congenial to the national view and compatible with the national temperament. For example, we might be expected to lean more heavily upon our technology than upon our manpower. Well and good, as far as it goes, but as in the case of our choice between fire and theft insurance there is another side of the coin. We are faced, quite clearly, with a threat from the Communists over which we have no control and which combines the most advanced military technology with a very large commitment of manpower. How do we choose to respond?

The simple but difficult fact is that the U. S. and its allies *must maintain at least a rough symmetry of strength with the Sino-Soviet bloc. This need not be always a matching of numbers but certainly it must be a matching of capabilities.* As the Soviet Union raises the level of its technology to a qualitative par with ours we are faced with the obvious necessity of raising the level of our effort to liquidate a long standing quantitative inferiority. Lest this point be lost amongst all the words, it means that U. S. and allied forces—specifically including land forces—must be greatly increased in both conventional and nuclear capabilities, increased in NATO, in the Far East and in strategic reserve. Unless we force ourselves to look this problem squarely in the eye we are accepting second place voluntarily. Surely nations may, like men who stop trying, put their foot on a forlorn road—all downhill.

We must have strategic forces as a deterrent to the enemy

However, we hear it argued that it is unnecessary to maintain forces large enough to cope with the Soviet Union on the ground for, it is said, we will never accept battle on those terms. But just here, a crucial error is made. *It is not necessary to believe* that a certain scale or type of war is likely to occur in order to find a rationale for maintaining forces with the capability to fight it. In fact, the whole logic of deterrence is quite the opposite. We maintain strategic nuclear strike forces for the very purpose of assuring ourselves to the maximum extent possible that it will not be necessary to use them. They deter effectively only insofar and as long as their capability is so visible and credible that the enemy can *calculate* the outcome of a war at any point in time and

see clearly that it would be unprofitable for him to initiate hostilities at that level. Precisely the same function is, or should be, served by other kinds of military force. Even if the 175 Soviet Army divisions are never used they may well serve their ultimate purpose. For example, in every crisis, and in every negotiation such as those over Berlin or Quemoy the planners, the negotiators, and the decision makers on both sides act very much in light of their respective calculations regarding the outcome of military action should it ensue. If, in each such calculation, the other side would appear to win we would soon be paralyzed politically—blackmailed into a series of critical concessions—and should war occur we would probably be defeated militarily. Thus at the heart of each crisis, each threat, lie the cold hard facts of military power.

We are just leaving the time when a capability to win a general nuclear war with strategic bombers carrying nuclear weapons permitted us to economize in forces for all other levels of conflict. This didn't stop all the lesser wars during the past 14 years but it did effectively neutralize the Red Army. They knew, and we knew, that in any major action we could have raised the ante—and won. We now enter a period where neither side would be wise to go all the way and because of certain basic advantages on the Soviet side, such as the option of first strike and the fact that they are aware of the location of most of our strategic air and missile bases, we would be least likely to pursue such a course. This means that we and our allies must maintain a rough symmetry of capabilities with the Communist bloc in each category of force, or at some point we simply will be faced with a bet we cannot cover. To stretch this analogy further, if neither side can afford to play with the blue chips the man with the largest stack of the red chips can buy out the game. If all the players have equal stacks of non-playable red chips, those with the larger pile of whites can still buy the pot.

A hypothetical situation illustrates the problem

To be even more specific—let us imagine the situation which might exist someday in country X just after country Y has threatened to seize a small but symbolic piece of territory which X is committed to defend. The Chief of State of country X calls in his Senior Military Advisor and asks for an estimate of the military situation. Let us suppose the general (or admiral) reports as follows:

GENERAL (solemnly). If this crisis were to expand into an unrestricted general nuclear war we estimate that casualties here at home would probably range between one-third and one-half of our population, and our major cities and nearly all of our heavy industry would be destroyed.

Thus general nuclear war is not a desirable development from our standpoint even though the casualties in country Y might be comparable.

If hostilities were to be confined to the tactical use of nuclear weapons I am sorry to report that we would probably lose, because we have significantly smaller forces at our disposal even though they are about on a par with the forces of country Y on a qualitative basis. I do not recommend that we initiate, or allow ourselves to be drawn into, a tactical nuclear war.

If the action is restricted to conventional weapons I am also sorry to report that we would probably not win because country Y has large conventional forces at its disposal which neither we nor our allies can match. In summary, in the opinion of your military advisors it would be a mistake to be drawn into hostilities of any kind at this time.

CHIEF OF STATE (plaintively). Yes, but what can we do in the face of an open threat by country Y which may initiate hostilities at any time on a basis favorable to them?

GENERAL (firmly). Negotiate, your excellency—and give up as little as possible.

If a national strategy concedes superiority to the Communist world in terms of total military strength or in any major category of force then it has a fatal weakness. Somehow, some place, and some time the Communists will find ways and means of making that superiority felt.

Psychological aura of power will vanish if we lag behind

Surely, also, we must take account of the fact that there is such a thing as an aura of power—a mystique which surrounds those nations which are strong and respected. It is helpful to be considered 10 feet tall. Such an aura has been accumulated by the U. S. over many years but it is a psychological thing which will vanish if we accept second place, no matter how we might rationalize that fact.

The Russians understand the role of strength. In the first sentence of *The Soviet Image of Future War*, Dr. Raymond Garthoff quotes from the Soviet professional journal, *Military Thought* as follows: "The object of military strategy is the creation by military means of those conditions under which politics is in a position to achieve the aims it sets for itself."

Khrushchev understands the role of strength:

". . . The Soviet Union will not stand still while they [the U. S., 1958] catch up with us. . . . We shall be seeing to it that they don't catch up with us. . . ."

It has been necessary to discuss the role of strength in order to place the problem of dual capabilities in a proper perspective. The most fiendishly clever balance between nuclear and conventional capabilities won't amount to a hill of beans if submerged in a net inferiority of strength.

As to whether a war, if it occurs, actually will be conventional or nuclear no one can possibly know with certainty beforehand. There are many pressures at work to make the next war—even a small war—nuclear. For example, most air and missile weapons systems are designed around the nuclear weapon. Many contend that the modern multimillion-dollar aircraft is not an economical carrier of the iron bomb. And others are convinced that it is no longer logical to risk a modern jet aircraft unless it is carrying a nuclear weapon. Then too, there is a lingering public distaste for Korean type wars which seems to fortify the theory which says: "let us use our most effective weapons." Additionally there is a great myth, which has nearly become an article of national faith, which contends that the Western nations cannot meet the Communists on a man-to-man basis. This is not true statistically, either from the standpoint of manpower or of economic resources. If it is true spiritually, the war is already lost.

But, working in the other direction—that is, against the use of nuclear weapons—are many other forces perhaps less tangible but conceivably as powerful. First, no one has come forth with a very convincing or comforting argument as to how limited nuclear war would remain limited. Although the ghastly penalties, if the war should expand, certainly would have a powerful braking effect, the "Kiloton Creep" which might occur would be a steady force for expansion.

Whether these opposing tendencies or pressures would, or could, reach a stable equilibrium, no one knows, nor can he know in advance of actual experience. Therefore, if a great reluctance develops toward taking the first step of firing in anger of the first nuclear weapon, no one should be much surprised.

Certainly to the extent that fear of general nuclear war inhibits nations from taking any action which might lead to such a war, to that same extent could it tend to make limited war less likely. On the other hand, to the extent that a general nuclear war with its attendant risk of terminating civilized life on this globe is regarded as unacceptable, to that extent might the level of provocation increase without recourse to general war and such a level could conceivably include limited nuclear war. To choose one of these likelihoods to the exclusion of the other requires an insight beyond the ken of this writer.

Even though the idea persists that nuclear weapons should be used whenever it is to our military advantage to do so, there is a growing recognition that this is far too narrow a basis on which to judge. It is entirely conceivable that a careful evaluation of the net military, political and psychological effects associated with the introduction of nuclear weapons into a particular area might well override the purely military consideration. For example, a war might conceivably be won in some one area using nuclear weapons in such a devastating manner that no other country would ever agree to accept our help no matter how dire their circumstances or imminent their surrender.

If, some years ago, the U. S. had decided to organize its land forces exclusively for nuclear warfare we would have been unable to influence the long sequence of conventional actions which have actually occurred. In each of these actions there were overriding reasons—often political, sometimes military—for not using nuclear weapons.

Past military triumphs don't win future conflicts

If, on the other hand, we had set out on the opposite course by renouncing all nuclear weapons we would cut a strange and quixotic figure as the leader of the free world military alliance. The prospect of Seventh Army devoid of nuclear weapons facing the Soviet Army, equipped as it is with a startling array of nuclear missiles and rockets, is simply unthinkable. Unthinkable, too, is an army which turns its back upon the future and faces resolutely to the rear seeking to re-create its earlier triumphs.

We are approaching that point at which we can regard tactical nuclear forces as a deterrent to the initiation of tactical nuclear warfare much as we now consider long-range bomber-missile forces principally as a deterrent to general nuclear war.

If, during a so-called limited conventional war such as that in Korea, the Communist side believed that a surprise attack with tactical nuclear weapons would destroy our forces and produce for them a sudden victory, they might be tempted to make such an attack. This would confront us with a situation which could only be rectified by our resort to a much higher level of nuclear use. In this case they would be in a position to remind us, quite logically and convincingly, that an expansion of nuclear warfare would probably lead directly and quickly to the general nuclear war which neither side could want or afford.

If, on the other hand, our forces were armed with instantly available and relatively invulnerable tactical nuclear weapons which could strike back at the enemy and rob him of his victory, then

he would be less likely to attack. But if he were to attack under these circumstances and then find victory beyond his grasp, he in turn would be faced with the hard choice of discontinuing his offensive or taking upon himself all the risks of general war involved in expanding the scope or pace of his nuclear weapons employment. At this stage of the game it would be difficult to predict or visualize the outcome of a tactical nuclear war between roughly evenly matched adversaries. Monumental problems of vulnerability—logistical as well as tactical—would plague both sides. It is enough to say that neither side could look upon such an engagement with assurance or equanimity. Unless and until the level of tactical mobility is raised on a par with tactical nuclear firepower it is not unreasonable to believe that neither side could maneuver effectively with significant forces and a smoldering stalemate would ensue. This prospect could easily extend the strategic stalemate down into the realm of tactical nuclear warfare as well. This would be deterrence at a new and lower level—deterrence based upon a rough match in tactical nuclear capabilities effectively integrated with conventional forces in a system of dual capabilities.

The Army has no alternative: it must be ready for any type of war

For all of these reasons—the dual nature of the threat, the requirement for strength and symmetry, the towering political problems involved, the impossibility of judging beforehand the form hostilities are most apt to take—the Army has no choice, but must continue to develop and deploy forces capable of fighting either a conventional war or a nuclear war.

The most pressing practical problems which face the Army and challenge its professional competence are those involved in squeezing the most effective dual capability out of available resources.

Fortunately the difference between the nuclear force and the non-nuclear force is not so great as some seem to imagine. The reason for this is that almost all of the characteristics which are required for the nuclear force with the single exception of the nuclear weapons themselves would also benefit and increase the effectiveness of the conventional force. This pertains with equal logic to the means of air or ground mobility, to protection, to communication and to the logistic support forces and their equipment.

This is a happy coincidence and it provides an approach to organizational flexibility. Heavier armored forces are more effective in the very temperate zones where nuclear warfare between modern forces is the most likely. Armored forces also are least vulnerable to the nuclear weapon.

In those areas where distance and terrain discourage or prevent the use of heavily armored forces it is necessary and desirable to employ light combat forces which not only can move strategically and be partially supplied by air, but which also would seek to reduce their vulnerability to nuclear weapons through increasing use of tactical aerial mobility.

Tactical nuclear weapons must be integrated into both heavy and light forces so that their conventional capabilities are not impaired while at the same time their nuclear capabilities are not vulnerable to destruction by a surprise attack.

The current organization provides forces which are somewhat of this nature but they are rigidly fixed in division structures so that when a division is deployed the theater commander gets some of the elements he needs but also others which he might not need. For example, the light Pentomic division must be heavily augmented by the addition of armored personnel carriers to adapt it to the environment of Europe and Seventh Army.

There would seem to be merit in the idea of organizing heavy, perhaps medium and light, combat forces in separate TOE building blocks which could then be assembled in various combinations within non-TOE divisions heavily supported with organic and supporting mobile nuclear weapons systems in order to fit more precisely any set of variants in the enemy or the mission, mode of movement, terrain and climate, and nuclear or conventional operations.

From a national standpoint three categories of force are required. *First*, forces to deter a nuclear attack against the U. S. This involves a combination of offensive and defensive weapons systems together with the necessary warning and communications so that unacceptable damage could be inflicted upon any enemy who might consider attacking the U. S., even if he had the advantage of striking a first surprise blow. *Second*, conventional land, sea and air forces which, together with our allies, *can match Communist conventional capabilities*. This need not be a man-for-man match with every second string Communist Army if we take advantage of Western productivity and press on with modernization of our own and allied forces. *Third*, integrated with conventional forces a tactical nuclear capability strong enough to deny an enemy the chance of victory through tactical nuclear warfare. Once attained, such a posture would give the U. S. the most effective safeguard against the destruction inherent in the nuclear weapon without defaulting upon its responsibilities to its allies, to the free world, and to itself.

5

UNIFICATION: HOW MUCH MORE?

Col. WILLIAM E. DePUY

There have been only two modes of life in the Pentagon: preparation for the next reorganization, and recovery from the last. As a practical matter these periods overlap and become one. Therefore, the views which follow are based on the assumption that the subject is very much alive. They spring from the further assumption that professional soldiers should set forth their views on these matters which recently have been largely monopolized by laymen. Only one aspect is examined here: the role of the services.

Some area of underbrush needs clearing before the basic issue can be approached. The last 15 years have seen a somewhat uneven progress toward what is loosely called "unification." There has been a steady accumulation of power around the person and the office of the Secretary of Defense. Recently, the strength and scope of the Joint Staff were also increased. There has been, consequently, a diminution in the autonomy and authority of the several services. It is clear, however, from reading the debates in the Congress, and the testimony of Government witnesses, that no one has a very clear idea of where this process is leading, or indeed should lead. The public debates have been mostly distinguished by their tendency to wander off in pursuit of catch-phrases of doubtful value or significance. For example, anything that even vaguely suggests the desirability of increasing the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—or worse, suggests the possibility of a "single Chief of Staff"—is immediately attacked by allusions to dangers of creating "a man on horseback." Oddly enough, this charge seems to carry some weight even though no one ever seriously suggests that such a plan would produce a Napoleon, or a Genghis Khan or a Charles XII.

Even the President, with his enormous and open-ended powers including that of Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces, finds it impossible to mount his horse and ride roughshod over the Congress, the press or even the services. In fact, the checks and balances within the U. S. Government seem to be working better than the Founding Fathers ever imagined.

Another specter which appears whenever the size or powers of the Joint Staff are discussed is the fear of creating a "great General Staff." Those who brandish this forensic weapon never get down to cases or bother to distinguish between the great General Staff of Moltke, or Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) of World War II. Without spending too much time on this detour, we might recall that Moltke's system was a unique and still controversial relationship between commanders and their principal staff officers who (the staff officers, that is) maintained a special relationship with their brother general staff officers at higher and lower headquarters. It was certainly not this system which led to World War I, but rather, and typically in the case of Germany, the political overlords who misused the undoubted military talents of the German people. During World War II, OKW was crippled to some extent from the beginning by the

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personal interference of Hitler who appointed and relieved its chiefs on the basis of their compliance with his wishes and the degree to which they shared his delusions. Even crippled as it was, OKW and Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres, or OKH) prosecuted a long, bitter and nearly successful war on meager national resources against the overwhelming strength of the Allies and the Russians. Whatever else may be said about the German General Staff, it can hardly be charged with inefficiency. If it was wicked as well, it was the wickedness of Hitler and the failure of the German generals to restrain him. Ironically, it was the reluctance of the German General Staff to become involved in politics rather than the reverse which is the usual basis of their indictment.

More recently, discussions of "unification" have wrestled with a maxim which is said to have developed from the experience of World War II, to the effect that "separate land, sea and air warfare is a thing of the past." Obviously, the phrase has some substance. If, for example, it means that the infantryman cannot win wars alone—that is, without airplanes and so on—then who can quarrel? On the other hand, if it means that armies, navies, and air forces are outmoded, then there are people who would disagree—myself included. In any event, it is not so definitive a statement as to be very useful as a guide to future action.

In addition to the clichés which tend to sidetrack us, we should note some permanently operating factors. The Congress, charged as it is with the Constitutional responsibility of raising and maintaining armies and navies (some people amuse themselves by imagining that the USAF is unconstitutional), finds it difficult to keep up with the Executive branch. With its vast powers and resources, the Executive branch tends to overwhelm the Congress. As a consequence, the Congress finds it helpful to be able to call witnesses directly from the individual services as a means of keeping tabs on the Department of Defense and on the Administration's military plans and policies. For this reason, among others, the Congress tends to view further unification with suspicion and fear. Suspicion that too much power is being accumulated by the Executive as opposed to the Legislative branch, and fear that a curtain of silence would fall around a too highly centralized defense establishment and make it impossible for the Congress to be informed on those defense matters for which it is responsible under the Constitution.

The Administration (meaning the White House, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Department of Defense) has consistently favored a greater concentration of power in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Part of this is institutional and reflects the growth of the already extensive office of the Secretary of Defense with its array of assistant secretaries, special offices and agencies. Surely much of it arises out of the painful process which the Administration must endure each year as it forces reluctant services to accept smaller budgets than they individually feel they can accept.

Because the services traditionally feel a responsibility toward the nation, the Congress and their own institutional consciences, and because the services have political constituencies in and out of the Congress, industrial supporters and publicity outlets, there is an outburst of so-called "interservice rivalry" each year at budget-cutting time, or whenever a service feels its vital interests are threatened. Quite naturally this phenomenon, which has an unruly look about it, is distasteful and painful to the Secretary of Defense. He tends to favor measures which reduce the autonomy of the services and their ability to outflank him through the press and the Congress.

In their individual attitudes toward "unification" the services themselves have followed a somewhat erratic course. At the end of World War II, the Army was the chief proponent of

unification. The Air Force was concentrating upon its goal of "independence." After some initial hesitation, the Navy came out strongly for service autonomy and loose central direction by a weakly empowered Secretary of Defense.

The Navy remains largely opposed to any further increase in the power of the Secretary of Defense at the expense of the services. The Army has moved a long way toward the Navy view. Recently the Air Force has been favoring a merger of the services—something which sounds like complete unification. However, there is a suspicion that the view of the Air Force may be based more upon a desire to see the adoption of a single strategy than upon carefully thought out organizational premises. Within the past year or two, the strategy which the Air Force favors has been challenged in a number of quarters and might very well not be the strategy adopted by a single or merged service. Whether this possibility will work to reduce Air Force enthusiasm for unification, only time will tell.

How much more?

Now, what are the real issues? How much more "unification"do we want? The analysis which follows concentrates on only one aspect, but an important aspect, of this problem: the role of the services. My own experience in the Pentagon during the past 14 years together with that in certain foreign military establishments, seems to support four general propositions:

- The Army, Navy and Air Force continue to perform essential functional roles and are not mere relics of a dead past.
- Service functions are the basis of service doctrine, which is the mainspring behind the development of effective fighting forces.
- The complex process involved in the organization, training and equipping of fighting forces should take place within the service which has been assigned the basic function those forces are designed to discharge.
- Basic functions should not be split between two services. This requires some adjustment of currently assigned roles and missions.

If these propositions can be substantiated, they would constitute extremely useful guidance for the further efforts at reorganization which are so sure to be forthcoming. Let us look at them more closely, one at a time.

The Services Continue to Perform Essential Functional Roles

If suddenly the services were to be merged into one, the single secretary and his single chief of staff would face an interesting organizational problem. They would surely be forced to divide their gargantuan establishment into manageable functional elements. They could, if they wished, re-create at once a land, a sea, and an air force. They might, however, consider other combinations such as a force for general war and a force for limited war; or they might think in terms of a strategic force and a tactical force. But whatever scheme they might finally adopt, it would work better or worse depending upon the logic and clarity with which the functions were divided. Therefore—and this is embarrassingly obvious—the real question is not whether there should be one service or three services or five; but rather how should the major functions be logically divided and assigned?

Historically—that is, up to World War I—there were two broad combatant functions: to fight on land and to fight at sea. When the airplane came along, it was used at first to assist the fighting on land and sea. This was logical and proper. There were still just two combatant functions. But in due course the airplane developed the new capability of overleaping the land and sea battle and striking at the heart of the enemy's country. Thus, a new combatant function evolved. For a long time, this new function was confused with the means of performing it—the airplane. But that is another story which must await its turn.

At the present time, with a few notable variations, the three services are centered upon these three basic combatant functions. We know intellectually that the Army, Navy and Air Force only organize, train and equip forces which they then turn over to unified commanders who employ them under the strategic direction of the Secretary of Defense assisted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But there are some things we accept intellectually which we have not yet digested emotionally. So we continue to think instinctively in the old traditional patterns in terms of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force as the fighting services. This new relationship is subtle and is still evolving. Its essence seems to be that the services are not so much retailers from whose shelves the unified commanders pick and choose the combat elements they think they need, but rather that the services are more like the architect-builder or the designer-engineer who, as the acknowledged expert, advises the customer as to what he needs to do his job and then proceeds to produce it for him. This relationship is much like that between the Chief of Staff of the Army and his Chief Signal Officer who advises on the number and kind of signal troops required and then organizes, trains and equips them.

Service functions are the basis of service doctrine and service doctrine is the mainspring behind the development of effective fighting forces.

Service doctrine is the whole process by which a fighting service is built up around a combatant function. Thus doctrine, in its broadest sense, is everything the services have been, are today, and plan to be. The development and evolution of doctrine and its inculcation, mostly in the minds and hearts of the officer corps, are the life thread and the pulse of the fighting services. By definition and natural law, doctrine is institutional in character. Doctrine and the institution which it nourishes, and in turn, upon which it feeds, are exactly coextensive. There is no doctrine outside the institutional walls—nor can the institution creep outside the doctrine which is its rationale. The practical effect of this phenomenon is that the functions, which are split between two services, result in crippled and stunted military organizations and incomplete doctrine. On the other hand, doctrine, which flows freely from functions properly and clearly assigned, is the mainspring behind the development of effective fighting forces.

There is another aspect of doctrine which bears remembering and preserving. Because the services are solemn and venerable institutions they have acquired a wide range of traditions and values, and a long history of legendary exploits, victories and successes. These too are part of doctrine although they are seldom seen or fully understood until in some epic moment they become incandescent in action as at Carentan, in the battle of Midway, on Iwo Jima, or in MIG Alley.

The complex process which leads to the development of fighting forces should take place wholly within the service which has been assigned the function those forces are designed to discharge.

The development of effective fighting forces has traditionally followed an easily discernible pattern. Although officially we use the phrase "organize, train and equip," the process is slightly more complicated and somewhat wider than these three terms imply.

Starting with doctrine, the sequence includes research and development of weapons plus the evolution of organizations that are to employ those weapons. These two, together, lead to the development of tactics and techniques in which the forces are trained. The sequence is brought to life with men, money and material through a system of programming and budgeting. Now this sequence could be expressed in any of a hundred ways; but the important fact to grasp is that all are interconnected. Traditionally, and today, the services have performed this function. The question is simply whether or not this sequence, this process, should be performed by the services, by the OSD, or by a combination of both. The several steps require closer scrutiny.

- The first step is doctrine. Men come and go, weapons change, but doctrine is constant. In this sense, doctrine is the blueprint, the general specification for the force. Although doctrine is clearly the essential first step in producing fighting forces, neither OSD nor JCS has been able to make any doctrinal contributions on this level. Divorced by one echelon as they are, and must be, from the function of producing fighting forces, they have no basis for generating doctrine.

- The second step is research and development. The development of military characteristics for certain weapons and equipment is an outgrowth of doctrine playing, as it were, among the technical possibilities. The Army calls this process "combat development," and includes as well within the process the evolution of organization. In recent years, OSD has been active in the R&D field but chiefly in the role of referee. The function which seems to be performed by the various officials and offices in the R&D business at Defense level is one of evaluation and regulation of the R&D activities of the services when they seem to overlap or collide. OSD is not really in the creative end of R&D which draws its inspiration and thrust from the doctrinal machinery and institutional vigor of the services as they seek continuously to extend, improve, or augment their respective capabilities to perform their basic functions.

  Generally speaking, agencies which lie outside a functional field have an inadequate basis for evaluation and judgment. For example, within recent years, a number of operations research agencies have appeared within, and on the fringes, of the services and OSD. Notwithstanding the high value placed by these agencies on detached scientific objectivity, the record seems to show that their most effective work has been done during periods when they have deeply involved with one of the services as proponents or designers of weapons systems rather than as mere analysts and evaluators. In other words, the "kept" scientist is the best scientist because he enters the doctrinal environment of one of the services and works more effectively and more relevantly from within it.

- The third step is organization and training. The interaction of doctrine, weapons and organization leads to the development of tactics and techniques which are rehearsed and standardized through the process of training. Part of this function involves test and evaluation of tactics, weapons and organizations through field training exercises which in time of peace are the closest thing to combat experience. The lessons learned through these exercises are then fed back into the doctrinal process, into the R&D programs and emerge in the form of organizational modifications. Obviously, this cycling and recycling must be

a closed circuit if it is to function properly. An entire field army, in a sense, is a vast, integrated weapons system. The interdependence of the working parts of the field army—that is, the integration of infantry, artillery, armor, engineers, signal and other supporting elements, is the ultimate expression of Army doctrine. The Navy and Air Force have similar talent in their functional and doctrinal fields. It has never been suggested that this group of functions could be performed outside the services. Obviously, too, it could not be divided between the services and OSD.

There are two aspects to programming which should be noted. First, that programming has become so complex and interwoven, that one change in one program usually sets off a chain reaction throughout the entire service structure. For example, a decision to stretch out the procurement of some weapon automatically affects personnel programs, training programs, deployments, maintenance and operations, and a whole network of ancillary programs relating to supporting tactical and administrative units and installations. The second important aspect to recognize about programming, is that it can be done only within a single administrative and budgetary authority, and that authority must be the one charged with the basic combatant function. This is so because changes in programs affect capabilities and usually require some re-balancing of forces. Any rejuggling of forces requires doctrinal judgment taken in the light of the mission—that is, the function.

Theoretically, the budget simply enables the programs to take effect.

In practice, programming and budgeting are a combined operation of give-and-take. Although the programs are forced to conform to a budget ceiling, from the standpoint of our discussion the actual distribution of the budget between the various programs is the decisive process. Unless the programs and budgets are synchronized with the earlier steps involved in the production of fighting forces, then, of course, everything would be an exercise in futility.

We have seen how each step involved in the development of fighting forces flows out of a preceding step, and how the entire process is an integrated whole which draws its energy and direction from the basic doctrine of the services. We see clearly that this process belongs within a single functional element. This is why, for example, it has never been possible to centralize successfully all R&D in one defense-wide agency.

Basic functions should not be split between two services.

Just after World War I, the Royal Air Force was assigned the responsibility for providing aircraft and pilots for the Royal Navy. This split the basic function of providing weapons essential to the prosecution of the battle at sea between the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy. During the period leading up to World War II, naval warfare was being revolutionized by the development of the aircraft carrier. The split responsibility, and the difficulties arising from it, put the Royal Navy so far behind that it never quite caught up by war's end, even though in 1937 the responsibility for carrier aircraft had been passed back to it. Even the redoubtable sailors of the British Navy found it impossible to make up for those lost years during which they did not control the development of what proved to be the primary naval weapon of World War II—the carrier aircraft. On the other hand, the U. S. Navy had full control of naval aviation and led the world in developing and using carrier aircraft.

The Italian Air Force also gathered under its wings the aircraft of the navy. At the battle of Matapan, in 1942, the reconnaissance aircraft of the Italian Air Force were elsewhere when the British Mediterranean fleet surprised and destroyed a large element of the Italian fleet. Clearly, the hapless Italian admiral did not control all the weapons systems he needed to do his job.

During World War II the Soviet Air Force, in a doctrinal and organizational sense, was dominated by the Red Army. As a consequence, that segment of the Soviet Air Force which was involved in the land battle functioned remarkably well. That portion which should have been involved in the bombardment of the German homeland remained feeble and underdeveloped to the very end of the war. The function and the doctrine of strategic bombardment was never properly developed in the Soviet system because it was submerged in an organization devoted almost exclusively to land warfare.

During 1939–40, the Luftwaffe looked like a perfect example of the feasibility of doctrinal and organizational cooperation between a separate air force and an army. We all remember the Stuka-Panzer teams which were so effective in Poland and France. But as the years went by, the German air force was drawn steadily away from the army into its own functional field. First, the bombing of Britain; then, gradually, the air defense of the German homeland. At Stalingrad and in Normandy, the army found itself without effective air support. Of course, part of this was due to the Allied victory in the battle for air superiority; but surely part was due to the fact that the German air force was drawn off into that domain which attracts the interest, the energy and the funds of both the U. S. Air Force and the Royal Air Force—the strategic bombing mission, or in the case of Germany, the defense against it.

Splits today in U. S. forces

Since 1947, there has been a steady stream of evidence that the functions of the U.S. Army and Air Force are split and confused. Unfortunately, in the very beginning, the function of strategic bombardment was confused with the means of performing it—the airplane. Only recently has this misconception begun to subside because obviously the missile has begun to perform many of the same functions. As a result of this confusion between ends and means, the Royal Air Force, and later the U.S. Air Force, set out to acquire anything and everything that flew. From a doctrinal and logical standpoint, they were quite right in acquiring the strategic bombers and those fighters required for the air defense of the continental United States and Britain. But they were quite wrong in going after naval air (the aircraft involved in the prosecution of the battle at sea) or tactical air (the aircraft involved in the battle on land). As we have seen, the Royal Air Force succeeded in getting both for a time, while the U.S. Air Force acquired only the tactical air forces designed to support the Army.

When the Army supported the creation of an independent Air Force, soldiers assumed that it would be one part of a package, the remainder of which would feature one department, one civilian secretary and a single chief of staff. Presumably, the Army believed that such a strong authority at the center would see that the new Air Force provided all the tactical air support the Army required, more or less as it had during the war. As it turned out, the Army was naive both doctrinally and politically. The Air Force became independent, all right, but no strong central authority was created. Ever since that time, the Army has been in varying degree a "dissatisfied customer" of the Air Force.

The Army depends increasingly upon aerial mobility on the battlefield to overcome terrain obstacles and to begin to redress the balance between fire and maneuver which has been thrown badly out of kilter by the nuclear weapon. Because the Air Force has been assigned the function of providing forces for close combat support, reconnaissance, interdiction and tactical airlift, the Army has been unable to control the number, the type, the deployment or the operational doctrine of many of the aircraft on which Army forces depend for success. It is worth mentioning here that in this regard the plight of the British Army is wholly pathetic. The Royal Air Force underestimates the importance of aerial mobility to the British Army, while British Army aviation is restricted to a few of the smallest artillery spotting and reconnaissance aircraft.

Within the past ten years, U.S. Army aviation has enjoyed a phenomenal growth. By recognizing the airplane as a commonplace means of getting about somewhat faster than on the ground, the Army decentralized its aircraft into all the arms and services. Every branch now uses large and increasing numbers of aircraft in the pursuit of traditional tasks. This growth cannot be explained as an attempt by the Army to invade the special province of the Air Force. Rather, it is the consequence of Army doctrine following the natural lines of the Army's basic function; and in this case, seeking to extend and improve battlefield mobility through the use of flying machines and to improve the effectiveness of its firepower by mounting it on aerial platforms.

By designing aircraft which can compete at 60,000 feet with the best the Russians can fly, the Air Force has literally and figuratively flown away from the Army. The multimillion dollar supersonic jet is not an economical weapons system for attacking enemy tanks or infantry strong points. Yet more than ever before the Army needs airborne weapons systems for this purpose. Even if one could agree with those who claim that the latest fighters are as effective in ground support as their propeller-driven predecessors, certainly it is not arguable that we can afford enough of them for this task.

No one should blame the Air Force for this state of affairs. It is drawn instinctively, powerfully and understandably to the function it considers most important: its own. It would be against all experience and logic if it were to act in any other way.

Because the Army and Air Force functions have been loosely set forth, both services have been drawn into the business of continental air defense. The Air Force entered the field initially because it believed its function was to fly airplanes for whatever purpose. It is easy to see why Army antiaircraft artillery was deployed in the air defense of the U.S. But as the Air Force begins to move away from the aircraft as its rationale and into the more stable functions of strategic bombardment and continental air defense, it becomes more and more painfully obvious that the Army is in the middle of that function with its surface-to-air missiles deployed in the continental U.S. air defense. The conduct of this defense is becoming an increasingly technical and complicated affair, as is the electronic environment in which it operates. The Air Force has long held that this complex of warning, communications, identifications systems and control of both offensive and defensive weapons systems must be completely integrated; and therefore, that the whole system must be planned, designed and operated by one agency, with one doctrine—the Air Force. The problems with Nike and Bomarc, the integration of Missile Master with SAGE, the tizzy over the Army's alleged doctrine of shoot-em-down-first-and-sort-em-out-later—these are fully predictable results of symptoms of the basic trouble which arises when functions are not carefully defined and assigned.

If the three basic functions we have described were to be aligned precisely with the three services, their charters would look something like this:

Charters for the services

The Army would be responsible for providing those forces and weapons systems required for the successful prosecution of war in the land environment which is defined as the surface of the earth, the boundary layers of air and the contiguous waters of the sea which touch the land and in which the forces and weapons systems involved are deployed and fight directly in the land battle.

The Navy would be responsible (as indeed it is now) for providing those forces and weapons systems required for the successful prosecution of war in the maritime environment. The maritime environment is defined as that area of the ocean's surface and depths and the air above them, and land on the shores of the sea, in which forces and weapons systems directly involved are deployed and fight in the maritime battle.

The Air Force would be responsible for providing those forces and weapons systems required for the offensive and defensive aspects of strategic intercontinental air and missile warfare. Specifically, the Air Force would be responsible for providing forces for bombarding the enemy's homeland, and for defending our own against enemy bombardment.

This assignment of functions is very nearly complete and logical, but some bugs remain. Duplication is not automatically an evil. For example, all the services use trucks, small arms, food, medicine, telephones, and so on; but in the more expensive fields, such as aircraft and missiles, duplication is certainly not a virtue. It would be appalling to contemplate the cost if the Army were to duplicate the entire technical, research and base structure behind the tactical air command. It would be absurd to imagine the Polaris submarine manned by airmen. No matter how we may yearn to force everything into our handy mold, we must observe some common sense and fiscal limitations. So, one is tempted to tinker a bit with the formula in order to eliminate what would be some obvious nonsense.

A distinguishing characteristic of the field army is the mobility of all its elements. From the infantryman on foot or in his armored personnel carrier, to the hospital on wheels, every element can pack up and move into the next field or the next county and go into combat without outside help or delay. Army aircraft can take off from unimproved airstrips and Army machine shops and gasoline supplies roll on wheels. It would be a mistake to encumber this kind of an organization—the only kind that could hope to survive in an atomic war on the ground—with weapons which are tied to concrete installations, runways or pits. Furthermore, it is too early to tell whether we are nearing the end of the era in which it is necessary for supersonic aircraft to fight a local battle for air superiority; or whether missiles have changed or eliminated that function. In any event, the kind of aircraft which take off from concrete runways are still very much involved and necessary in today's battle. VTOL and STOL aircraft, which can live and operate in the environment of the field army simply are not yet (and may never be) developed enough to fight a battle for air superiority. But some day, perhaps within this decade, two things may happen which will help solve this problem. First, it may become commonly agreed that fixed airfields are too vulnerable for use in the area of the field army. Second, the VTOL and STOL aircraft may develop the necessary capabilities and characteristics to perform all or nearly all of

the tactical missions now performed by the Air Force. The jet VTOL recently built and flown by Messrs. Harlan and Wolff in Britain, would seem to be a big step in this direction.

So it would seem that the best solution from all standpoints, is to give the Army the green light on developing and using any aircraft so long as the flying machines could survive and operate in the combat environment of the field army. This means they would be STOL or VTOL, and could take off from and be maintained at mobile bases and unimproved fields. Within the limits of this stipulation, the Army's charter would include aircraft to perform the full range of missions now performed by USAF's Tactical Air Command, including close combat support, reconnaissance, interdiction, and tactical airlift. If, eventually, the Army could discharge the full tactical aviation role now being performed by the Air Force, then the Air Force would withdraw. The policing of the phase-over would be a challenging task for OSD and JCS.

The transfer of air defense could also be done in one great crashing blow, but here another possibility also exists. The current Nike Hercules battalions could be manned by Army troops for as long as those weapons remain operational. As, inevitably, they are replaced by some improved system, the Army could redeploy its personnel and funds into mobile missile systems for the air and missile defense of the field army. This purely Army need has gone begging for years, even though in the opinion of some it is a fatal weakness in army field forces.

The fighting elements of the Navy also are characterized by mobility. The Polaris submarine is designed to operate within the combat environment of the fleets at sea from which it draws its support and protection. Therefore, with regard to the Polaris problem and the problem of TAC and air defense, the most simple solution would be this one: Assign to the Army and Navy, respectively, responsibility for developing and manning all weapons systems which are deployed in a mobile configuration in the environment of the field army or the fleets at sea, and which depend upon the armies and fleets for support and protection. This addition to our basic formula leaves Polaris in the Navy. It gives Army aviation a green light. It opens the door to Army control of land mobile strategic missiles, if they are to be deployed in the area of the field army; and it leaves in Army hands the rocket weapons for air and missile defense of the field army. It gives air defense of CONUS to the Air Force and leaves the Navy with its happily balanced four-dimensional force. This kind of solution would seem to meet and establish at least one basic requirement for a sound defense organization: *that the basic functions of organizing, training and equipping land, sea and air forces should not be split between two services or between any service and OSD.*

Finally, we return to the question with which we started: How much more unification do we want? Having centered this discussion almost exclusively on the role of the services and having left unsaid the large and increasing scope of OSD and JCS, we can give only a partial answer. With certain specific modifications, we want to preserve the Army, the Navy and the Air Force as functional entities within the Department of Defense. Necessary and inevitable improvements in defense organization and in the operations of OSD and JCS should not be permitted to destroy the organizational or doctrinal environment which the services require in order to produce fighting forces of traditional quality.

6

LECTURE OF OPPORTUNITY – "VIETNAM"

By

Major General William E. DePuy, USA

20 March 1967

The transcript of this speech was provided by the librarian of the National War College, Washington, D.C., and is identified there as NWC-S-2977-67. The transcript is also located in General DePuy's papers at the TRADOC History Office, Fort Monroe, VA.

LECTURE OF OPPORTUNITY - "VIETNAM"
By
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(20 March 1967)

GENERAL DePUY: General:

This is a very difficult group to talk to. I happen to be aware of the fact that in your number here there are people who are real experts on various aspects of what went on in Vietnam because they participated in it. I have in mind, for example, such people as Ed Simmons, who was the G-3 of the III MAF and then commanded the 9th Marines, if I am not mistaken. In any event, he knows a lot more about that than I do. There are many others here in exactly that same situation.

I would hope that the question period which follows my very brief remarks would then focus on what you are interested in. I thought what I would try to do in 30 minutes—and do not be alarmed if I have a bad memory—is tick off chronologically the development of the situation over there as I saw it and lived through it. Then you will have some idea about what I know; then you will not ask me questions about things of which I know nothing.

I might say that generally the first two years as the 3, I had the Saigon view. I wandered around the countryside and visited advisers and units and so on. For the last year, when I was with the division, I did not return to Saigon ever. For one year what went on in Saigon is a complete mystery to me, I just do not know what went on in Saigon, and I would steer you away from questions on the last year in Saigon to save all of us a great deal of time.

I would like to tick along, starting in 1963 and ending up when I left, the war as I saw it, the major events, some ideas I have and some observations which I would like to make. In 1963, which was the year before I got there, but I spent a lot of time out there in 1962 and 1963, primarily with the Special Forces, the war was going very, very well. It was controversial government, but it was an effective one. The police were working pretty well. Diem had almost everybody organized into something, whether the girls or the Republican youth. The ARVN was building up, and things were moving along. The VC were not making any progress; in fact, I think they were slipping backwards.

In about June and July the trouble started. It culminated in the coup and assassination of Diem. Then there was a year of real problems, when everything came to a grinding halt. Immediately after the first coup the government lasted only a few months under Big Minh. All the province

chiefs were changed. The talent in South Vietnam has always been pretty thin; the French did not leave them in very good shape in the first place. These coups were very expensive in terms of talent because when you get rid of the province chiefs, you have to find 42 more; that is not easy to do. When you got rid of four or five of the top generals, you had to find four or five more. That was not easy. I think over the past four years you have seen a kind of general strengthening in the overall leadership available throughout the country.

About the fall of 1964, in fact, November of 1964, a very important development took place. By that time, even though there were still a series of political sort of tragicomedy taking place, they were all tragic, but some of them were fairly humorous, these coups. The Vietnamese, urged by General Westmoreland and others, had in fact attempted seriously to take all of the Vietnamese army units and regional and popular forces and scatter them out into the provinces and districts and patrol with small units and saturate the area. It was beginning to work. As a matter of fact, in the 2d Division area, up in Quang Tin, it worked very well.

It was beginning to work in Binh Dinh Province, but it was in November 1964 that the Viet Cong moved two regiments into Binh Dinh Province. They knocked off almost all of—I know all of you are aware of where these places are, but this happened to be just north of Quinhon, right up here in the Bong Son area, where the 1st Cav has had so many fights. They knocked off most of the independent patrolling companies. They killed or caused to disperse most of the regional and popular forces. Those they did not kill fled into the little triangular forts and became relatively inactive.

The following month in Phuoc Tuy Province there was a Catholic village of some 5,000 people—Binh Gia. In Binh Gia two regiments of Viet Cong under division command for the first time, to my knowledge—I am not sure there was never one before that, but I did not know of one—attacked and sustained operations for about five days. In the course of their operations there, they destroyed the 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalion and the 33d Ranger Battalion. They had a general who was riding around on a horse commanding this thing. They stayed on the battlefield. This had the most tremendous impact on the Vietnamese army and on the overall morale and psychology of the Vietnamese authorities. I might say it also had a tremendous impact on MACV and on Washington because this was an obvious and almost first example of what looked like the so-called phase three or open warfare on a sustained basis such as they had conducted against the French.

This had General Westmoreland worried. I am sure it had people back here worried. It was at that time there was the first serious consideration of major ground force deployments. They were not made immediately, but they were being seriously considered. Recommendations did come back at that time that it would not be long.

Then about February, when the bombing of the North started, this was triggered, although I would not say "caused" by the successive shelling of Holloway Army Airfield at Pleiku and the following day the blowing up of the hotel at Quinhon (see map). These two episodes, although not in themselves sufficient to start an air war against North Vietnam, were the events which in fact pulled the trigger.

In the following month, March or thereabouts, step by step jet fighters were thrown in. You may recall the jets were striking the North and were not being used in the South at one time. One policy decision after another was made; first the jets were turned loose in country, then the B-52s. Gradually it went on up. If I am not mistaken, the Marines landed in March. I believe the 173d Airborne Brigade landed in May. The most critical time of the war was, clearly, May, June and July of 1965. This was the bottom.

At that time there were about three or four major actions. One of those actions took place near Quang Ngai City at a town which has almost the same name as this one. This is Bien Hoa, and that is Vinh Ba. At Vinh Ba a couple of Viet Cong regiments attacked an outpost and then overwhelmed the ARVN, the Vietnamese and Marine action force. The 38th Ranger Battalion was completely destroyed. Again the VC stayed in the field for a little while, longer than anybody wanted them to.

At about the same time that happened, the 9th Viet Cong Division had fought this battle in December with two regiments, attacked Dong Xoai, again under division control. In the course of that battle it destroyed the First Battalion of the 7th ARVN Regiment and the 6th ARVN Airborne Battalion completely. During that period of time, as I recall, we were losing about one to two Vietnamese battalions a week, countrywide, and one to two district towns a week. District towns down here were given up; district towns over in here were given up; district towns out here—Dak Sut, north of Kontum; Thuan Mong, and so on—simply because the VC were attacking them, overrunning them, and the government did not reestablish them.

It was General Westmoreland's opinion at that time that the war had about six months to run maximum, were we not to come in in strength and fast; and I certainly agree with that. I am not


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even sure that we would have had the full six months. This was even with one Marine brigade and one Army brigade in country. The problem was simply this: Something had to be done to get the main force Viet Cong off the backs of the Vietnamese army and the regional and popular forces, and it had to be done very, very rapidly.

I would like to say a word about what I think has been the VC concept of the relationship between their main forces and their local forces. I will come back to this and try to make another point. As you know, every little hamlet tries to have a squad; every little village tries to have a platoon, every district a company, every province a battalion. Then behind that you have regiments and divisions, whether they come from the north or the south; they have the same general purpose in life. The VC system, which came to full flower in the last half of 1964 and first half of 1965 insofar as success was concerned was that if the little hamlets got in trouble, the squad, they called on the village platoon. If the village platoon could not handle it, they called on the district company, and so on up the line. What we were seeing happen in late 1964 and early 1965 was that the main force regiments had been called upon by the local VC organization, provincial or district, to come in, to just clobber the Vietnamese army, and by so doing, making it possible for the local VC to recruit more guerrillas and to extend their organization throughout the villages, hamlets and districts. They made a lot of progress; they were clearly succeeding. I personally do not think there was any choice at that time; you either came in and met that particular threat or you lost. I do not think it was a complicated decision to be made; it may have been an agonizing one in terms of what has happened since, but I think it was a black-and-white choice at that time; you either moved in or lost. That is my fixed opinion.

In the fall of 1965 and all of 1966 have been more or less characterized by a pretty massive deployment with many, many logistic difficulties. As always, the people out there wanted the forces faster than they could be provided. The limiting factor was not really the availability of combat forces, but was really of building a big enough structure to take care of it. I think when the history of the buildup is finally written and analyzed, it was a miracle, and that the logistic chances taken in order to get the forces there were considerable, but all apparently worked out okay.

When the United States forces began to deploy against this threat, the Viet Cong tested them very heavily, and I do not think any unit went into Vietnam without having a lot of very stiff battles right off the bat. I know that the Marines had a very stiff one just out of Chu Lai, not long

after they arrived there. I know that the 1st Cavalry Division had a heck of a fight up in the Ia Drang Valley when they started moving out. The 25th U.S. Infantry Division had to fight for its base camp at Cu Cui, and I know that the 3d Brigade of the 1st Division had to fight for its base camp at Lao Cai and is fighting for Highway 13 to this day. So, there was a period there in the fall of 1965 and the first half of 1966 where there was really a lot of testing going on.

Then enough people got in, and a rather sustained offensive has taken place ever since. I think it has had a very major impact in that what it has done is turn the coin over completely. I say that for this reason: If you look at and read your newspaper, you will get as much from that as anything else about where the battles are taking place today. I think you will find the bulk of them are not taking place in the populated areas. If they are, they are along the edge. In other words, up here, along the DMZ, along the foothills, up along the Cambodian border in this area, along the Cambodian border here and here; this is not true, however, in the Delta; but this is where the battles are taking place. The Delta is a different kettle of fish. What does this mean? It means to me that the dependence of the local VC forces on the main forces has been somewhat broken, not finally and not absolutely, but the area about which I know the most is just north of Saigon, this entire area here. It has been well over a year since any main force VC unit or North Vietnamese has fought a battle in a populated area. To me it means that they have not been able to come down to support the provincial battalions and the district companies. This may not be true throughout all of Vietnam. I think it probably is not. Looking at the picture broadly I think it is safe to say that the bulk of the main force VC are on the borders or pretty deeply back into the jungle and that they have had a minimum impact on the populated area and the problem which exists in the populated area.

This sets the stage, if that can be maintained; in other words, if the big boys can be held off with your left hand and you go out to fight them only when the opportunity is good and the prospects of success are high, and in the meantime operate in the populated areas, the chances in the long run are that this is about as far as the military side can go in solving the problem. I think this is what we see all over the place; at least, that is what I saw, and it is what made me leave, feeling rather well about the situation in the area in which for the last year I worked.

This brings me to the "other war," as it has now been dubbed. I would like to talk about the "other war," but I would like to say I think there are some oversimplifications and some generalizations being used with respect to it that really do not fit the facts on ground. In the first

place, it is not another war, if by the other war we mean that is the civilian war and that the Marines and the Army and the Koreans are going to fight just the main forces. There is this misconception; that does not mean that at all. I would venture to say that in the 1st Infantry Division we spent more than half our time on the other war. I know the Marines do the same thing. The 1st Cav does not because it operated to some extent often in areas with no population. So, (a) it is not a civilian war, the "other war." What it is, it is the war against the local forces. By that I include provincial, district, village, and hamlet. It is a very, very big war. There are a lot of provincial battalions, district companies and village and hamlet guerrillas.

(b) It is a very difficult war. I had some statistics pulled together for me before I left, and I found that we were killing about 5.8 VC per battalion day when we fought the big boys, but we were killing about 1.8 per battalion day when we were fighting the little ones. It is harder work. You get fewer, and your casualty ratios are not as satisfying because it is a boobytrap claim or war. But how is this war being fought? I cannot tell you how the Marines are fighting the war. A year ago I was reasonably close to it and much impressed. I would not try to say how they are doing now because I have not seen it. We have General Pott here and Ed Simmons, also others who can tell you.

In our area, and, I think, in the Korean area the "other war" was being fought in various ways. There has been a feeling, and I think it has been engendered in the last year that the "other war" is no business of the United States military forces, but, rather, is a war to be fought by the Vietnamese. This is not true, and it is not feasible to think about it in those terms yet because the problem of the "other war," the local war, is still too big a problem for the Vietnamese to handle alone. Once that problem is squeezed down to a smaller problem, the time will come when, I think, they can handle it. We are nowhere near that right now.

We tried two different approaches to the "other war" in the area in which I worked, and we worked with two divisions, the 1st Infantry Division and the 5th ARVN Division. Generally speaking, we tried to do the things they could not do. At one time we tried together to completely clean up one set of villages. Then having done that, we hoped to sort of expand the perimeter. This did not work very well. It is a kind of a waste of time because you are sort of trying to redecorate the kitchen while the living room is on fire. It is not a productive way to go about your business.

We changed, to take a bigger area, so that we could put pressure on the whole VC provincial system at one time. In other words, we would go after the provincial battalion and the local companies and the village and hamlet guerrillas on a sustained basis with large forces over a long period of time. It was a real war; it is beyond the capability of the Vietnamese to do it alone; it is a lot harder than going out fighting the big battles. And this is the point I would like to make.

For some reason or another some people feel it would be easier for the Vietnamese to do that kind of fighting, but I can assure you that it takes a better battalion of infantry to patrol seven days a week, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year with squads and platoons and companies than it does to go out every three months and have a big hoedown with the Viet Cong because you have to have a lot of good sergeants and lieutenants to patrol all the time with squads and platoons, and the leadership potential in the Vietnamese army is not up to it. They can do some of it, but they cannot do enough of it. If we can get the problem down to where there are fewer guerrillas around and the problem is less, the danger is less, there will come a time when they can do it. They want to do it; they are trying to do it; in some places they do it reasonably well; in most cases they do not do it quite well enough. So, it really boils down to the fact that the United States forces go out after the big boys when it appears profitable to do so or it is necessary to drive them back into the jungle and immediately go right back into the populated area and go to work. That is the pattern, and I do not see how that pattern can be changed or abandoned by some kind of a decision that we will do one thing and they will do another. I do not think it is happening out there, and I do not think it is practical to expect that it will.

In going about the business of depressing the general level of Viet Cong effectiveness and strength in a regional area like a province you have to do all sorts of things. Many, many of these things you cannot do yourself. I would think that out in Vietnam today the Marines and the Army, particularly, and a lot of Air Force support with various kinds of flying machines are really learning how to do psychological operations. I used to be in this business before, and we used to discuss it endlessly, but when you get right down to it, you have to do it on the ground. I think people are getting rather good at it. They understand it. It works, but it does not work in a vacuum, so I would like to make this point, that you cannot talk people into stopping what they are doing or surrendering with a clever argument alone.

You can sit and write extremely clever leaflets, broadcasts and appeals, and nothing will happen unless you combine it with a tremendous amount of military pressure. You can put a lot

of military pressure on and not get any "Chieu Hoi's" if you do not also do the other. I think everybody has learned that lesson, that it is a combination of the two; it takes a lot of artillery shells, a lot of bombing, a lot of patrolling, a lot of attacking, and a lot of broadcasting, leaflets and talks. It pays off, and people are learning how to do it. There is nothing mysterious about it at all except that most people out there now use the VC to write their leaflets. At least, we did in our area because they write better leaflets than Americans. They write them quite a different way than we would. They do not appeal much to me; they are rather flowery and long, but apparently they are better than the kind, the curt type we would become involved in.

How do you get the guerrillas out of an area? It is a fact of life that the guerrillas cannot get away because they are wedded to their village or their hamlet or their district, and the district company will not leave the district because if it leaves the district, it is by definition no longer the district company, so you kind of have them in the round-house there; they may be hard to catch, but you know they are going to stay in the district; you know the village guerrillas are going to be near the village. Usually they are as close as they can get. In other words, if they can dig a little tunnel or base camp only 10 meters outside the village, that is exactly where they will do it. They will have 5, 6, or up to 10 of these little hiding places for 10 to 20 people. You must get rid of those. You can do it in various ways. You can go in and blow them up.

Toward the end out there we got onto the bulldozer idea. We bulldozed down the jungle around the villages. I think this more than anything else led to a tremendous influx of guerrillas who could not figure out how to operate after that had happened. You also combine that with a lot of patrolling, raids, ambushes, artillery fire, and air strikes against the whole system.

Then you have the problem that the guerrilla may go inside the village while you are out mowing down the jungle. I think almost everybody in Vietnam has tried to solve that or has solved by repeated cordon and search operations at various times of the day and night. I can think of four or five villages that were cordoned and searched up to 15 times in a period of 7 months; every time the minimum take was 3 guerrillas. How was this done? It does not matter whether the United States or Vietnamese forces do this job; it is best to have both, but then the people who go inside the village and screen have to be the police, or at least have to be somebody who can go in and get all the people out and take them down to the police. I know there is a considerable interest in that aspect of it; it is getting better and better, but frankly, until very, very recently the system simply was not up to snuff. In other words, the police station at Vinh Son

City, up until December did not have a card with the man's picture and fingerprints on it, so we might pick him up 10 times and have him interrogated and send him back again, with no record of it. But this is coming along, and until it does come along and is a system which works throughout the country, it is very hard to clean up the place. The most productive operation you can have is to descend on the village, send the people to the police. The police identify the VC, and you have not fired a shot; nobody has been killed, civilian, military, or otherwise.

The iron triangle and Headquarters MR4, used to be the Saigon-Cholon-Djiring special sector. A document was captured in which the MR4 had ordered all VC cadre and all VC units to stay out of towns and villages unless they had the written permission of the military region headquarters because they were being picked up too rapidly by this type operation. It meant they had to go out into the jungle, into the base areas; then when you go into the base areas and eliminate them, you are beginning to present problems they cannot handle. In one very short period of time we had, in 2-1/2 weeks, 510 walk in and give up. That is the largest I know of in any short period of time. It was a combination of those tactics that did it, together with a great deal of firepower.

I see that my first 30 minutes are up, and I would like to close this one by saying that the worm has turned. What they were doing to us in 1964 and 1965 we are now doing to them. I would not want to speculate how long it will take. It is moving in the right direction, and the main forces are generally back in the jungle. The general organization, morale and effectiveness of the local forces are steadily—not fast enough, mind you—going downhill. I just cannot help but see success at the end of that road. There will be setbacks, and it will take a long time, but I do not see how you can lose once that is set up.

We had better keep the force ratios that are required to continue to do what we are doing, and, gentlemen, I think that will solve the problem.

Sir, I will break off at this point, and the questions will probably be more to the taste of the audience.

7

Army Leadership Moves Upward on Performance

by

Major General William E. DePuy

Gen DePuy, Special Asst for Counterinsurgency and Special Actions, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is former commander of the 1st Inf Div in Vietnam. This article is excerpted from an address given to representatives from ROTC at 147 universities and colleges who attended the Annual Meeting of the Association of the US Army in October. He was commissioned through ROTC at South Dakota State College (now University) and has served in the Army 28 years.

When I came in the Army in 1941, I was very much aware of my status as a Reserve officer and as a graduate from the ROTC in distinction from those Regular Army officers who came from the Military Academy or who had been commissioned in the Regular Army—in those days mostly from the Thomason Act. As the years have gone by, however, that feeling has disappeared until it never occurs to me either in respect to myself or in respect to any of my colleagues.

There may be those who continue to attach great significance to the source of a person's commission, but I rather think that they are few and far between, after a few years of service. I can assure you that while commanding the 1st Inf Div in Vietnam, I would have been unable to tell you which officers came from OCS, from ROTC or from West Point. Whereas I think I could have talked in some depth about the accomplishments and the caliber of all the brigade, battalion and most of the company commanders.

There are good reasons for this and statistics may tell the tale. For example, right now 27 percent of the colonels in the Army are ROTC graduates, 45 percent of the majors, and 47 percent of the captains. This year, 1,500 ROTC cadets will be commissioned as Distinguished Graduates in the Regular Army. There was a time when most of the general officers in the Army were graduates of the Military Academy. Although I suppose this is still the case, there are now 146 general officers who were commissioned from ROTC, constituting 28 percent of all the generals in the Army. Of the 146, there are three lieutenant generals, 59 major generals and 84 brigadier generals. Three Chiefs of Staff were educated at civilian colleges—General Leonard Wood at

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Harvard, General Marshall at Virginia Military Institute, and General Decker at Lafayette College.

Now all these statistics are meaningful in a way, but they miss perhaps the most important point of all, and that is that our Army, more than ever before in its history, now reflects and represents the people of our country in all of their diversity—geographic, economic, social and ethnic. This is good. It really means that the people and their Army are one. There are Armies in the world unlike ours in which the officers corps for one reason or another represents only a small social, economic or ethnic group. In most cases, these unrepresentative Armies evidence weakness of one kind or another and in almost every instance the remedy which is sought to correct the weakness has to do with bringing up, from amongst the people, the natural leaders.

It is not only fitting and proper that our Army should be so organized but it is almost automatic when viewed in the context of what this country really is. I notice that the sociologists increasingly use the word meritocratic, meaning very simply that those with merit are afforded an opportunity to rise through the social structure to the limit of their ability with few other qualifications or inhibitions. In many ways, this is an advanced sociological concept simply because all the students of advanced or successful societies recognize the necessity for upward mobility. The fact that our three Presidential candidates this year were all of humble social and economic origins is a perfect example.

You may know that the Communists place great stock in the necessity for merit and upward mobility. There was a time in the Soviet Union when only the sons of workers or peasants had a sufficiently clean background to aspire to positions of responsibility in the Communist hierarchy or in the Army. To a very large extent, this is true of the Viet Cong. Until very recently the South Vietnamese Army has been criticized for its unwillingness to promote on merit regardless of social, economic or academic backgrounds. Lest I go too far and be misunderstood, what I really am saying is that the United States Army, as much as any Army in the world today, reaches out into all walks of American life to find its leadership from amongst those who demonstrate the intellectual, moral and physical characteristics required to lead men in combat. I find this to be an inspiring situation and one which gives me confidence in the future of our country and our Armed Services.

There is a strange phenomenon associated with the command of men in war with which young and prospective leaders should be acquainted. The military hierarchy is characterized by some very stringent rules and regulations insofar as obedience to orders is concerned. It must be thus in war or in any well ordered organization. When the division commander orders the brigade commander to mount a particular operation, those orders must be followed—intelligently, of course, after an exchange of views between them—but in the last analysis, carried out without fail, and so it is between the colonel of the brigade, the lieutenant colonel of the battalion, the captain of the company and his lieutenant platoon leaders.

But, in all frankness, the system is a little different within the platoon. Within a rifle platoon, particularly, the lieutenant finds himself within a body of fighting men some 30–40 strong, of varying skills and backgrounds, involved in a hazardous, often unpleasant task. The lieutenant is in charge because presumably he is a natural leader as well as a trained officer. But at that level, the Uniform Code of Military Justice on which he must stand legally, is rarely the instrument through which he exercises command. He is concerned about the lives and fears and

hopes of his men and he feels very much a part of that small body. To the extent that he understands them and yet does not surrender to them, to that extent, he will become a great leader.

To lead, he must share their fears, their hopes, their aches and pains and still give to them strength and inspiration. Young America understands this. No matter what the generals may think, there is an equalitarian aspect to the rifle platoon. I reiterate that young America understands this. So, why is it not better to pick our lieutenants from the main stream of American life? Why is it not better to retain in them all of the insights of American youth and only add the skill, the determination and the pride of a military officer?

There is nothing complicated about the command of men in combat and, no matter how sophisticated leadership courses may become, there are only three steps to be performed, easy to state and not difficult to accomplish.

First, a leader of troops in war must decide in each tactical situation, or, for that matter, each administrative situation, exactly what it is he wants to do with his unit; military training of a tactical or technical nature should equip him to do this.

Second, he must tell his men precisely what it is he wants them to do and in most cases it is best to tell them in the language of the street, not the language of the field manual. If the officer knows with certainty and confidence what he wants to do, he will have no trouble telling his soldiers what he has in mind.

And then, lastly, he must insist that they do exactly what he has told them to do. This is the prescription for a great military leader. It is probably also the prescription for a banker, a baker or a candlestick maker. The only difference is that the stakes are higher, and in war mistakes can not be undone. I hope that each of you will remember those three steps and that you will not get lost in too many other considerations.

Good leaders come in all sizes, all shapes and from all backgrounds. Some are tall and handsome; most are not. Some are brilliant; most are not. But all are serious, straight-forward, diligent in learning their trade and insistent on performance. This is all there is to it and as you go back to your schools and thenceforth graduate into the real world of war or peace, I wish you luck, success, and happiness, and I want you to remember that you are walking with that great host of college graduates who are also officers, who have carried at least half of the burden of our country's defense in terms of leadership for as along back as I can remember.

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BRIEFING BY LTG DePUY
7 June 1973
[At Fort Polk, Louisiana]

I am going to ramble on for a little while. It seems to me that we all have to be aware of the fact that we are probably going to be members of an entirely different kind of an Army than we have belonged to for the last few years. Some of us have not been in the Army for 30 years, but some of us have, and longer than that. The American Army even today, and never anywhere more closely than here at Fort Polk, is the product of World War II. In fact, some of the training devices, etc., that we see in basic training were started in World War II and have not changed very much except for the worse. Anyway, what kind of an Army was that for World War II, Korea and Vietnam—a very big Army filled with draftees, expanded enormously in time of war and in the last war without calling the Reserves, which meant we had to set up a factory to produce privates and lieutenants and we did that and got away with it because Americans are good men on the average. World War II was the biggest example in which we took an Army of 200,000 and expanded it to eight million. And they were not very good. As a matter of fact they were awful. They were just above the level of disgrace and some of them were not that high. Men were just barely good enough for us to dare politically to put them in the war and we threw them all in the water and most of them learned to swim. Now, we still have some of that philosophy but that is really not what the future holds. The future is becoming clear. I could be wrong but maybe not, but at least for the foreseeable future, we are not looking for World War III. We are not buying ammunition or weapons for World War III. We couldn't fight one if we wanted to. We are not spending the time and money to maintain facilities or plants. More likely, the employment of our Army will be of a small force with two or three divisions. My guess is no matter how hard we guess, we don't know where they will be employed. We have always been wrong as to where the next war will spring up except that it will probably be small—could be in the Middle East and have something to do with oil but that is too obvious. We don't have any great enthusiasm in the US right now for a war. We don't have a lot of oil but would they conduct a war just for one point? Wars will tend to be like the Suez attack of the British and French and are very likely to be turned off by the world politicians as quickly as possible. And it means, therefore, that the most likely thing that any of you guys will be involved in will be something short, violent and important and we will not be able to get men, then run our two divisions in it before somebody turns it off by saying we are spoiling the environment. Something like this can happen. One or two or even three tank battalions might find themselves confronting the Syrian and enemy type battalions. We have to have one American tank battalion at least equal to five Arab tank battalions. One American infantry battalion has to be worth five of theirs and I really mean that. We have to be that much better. What I am trying to say is that this is a different kettle of fish than what we have been involved in in our careers up to now. Back in the 50's and 60's, Seventh Army was probably the most professional Army we have had in peace time ever,

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Manuscript provided by Major General William ("Bill") Carter, formerly General DePuy's executive officer.

and theirs was not good enough. They didn't even meet standards I am discussing now. We have got to be better than that by quite a large margin. We will have the advantage of having an all volunteer Army with longer tenure, so we have some disadvantages and some advantages. We don't have the high quality as we had coming in through the draft. We should take it as our mission to produce that level of professionalism which is about 500% higher than what we are used to. I say that conservatively—five times that what we are used to. I want what is done here to be five times what you are doing today and I will point out areas in which you can do that. I don't mean to be a smart aleck in saying that—I am quite sincere. Now, we are going to have only one infantry training center, and this is it, and that is good. We have only one place for infantry OCS, infantry basic and advanced and we want the NCOES cranked up at General Tarpley's place and we want to make squad leaders and platoon sergeants and that leaves a lot of doing. Now, I want to talk about the infantry and I am going to talk about a lot of aspects of it and end up with how it relates to this. Incidentally, we are going to have a 15-week training program, not 14. That is a decision. We are going to see that this, plus the Reception Station, plus what they get in fill week, the time waiting to get shipped out, their being pumped up with what they need, the discipline while under military control, and this complies with the law which says four months and that means 16 weeks. We are not going to ask for the law to be changed and we are not going to argue that the 14 weeks be changed to 15, but we are just going to do it. Fortunately, you now have another week to play with because it requires more time and you must rejuggle this a little. Let's talk about an infantry battalion—that is your business. I am not going to apologize for standing up here talking about the infantry. I'll tell you one thing, I have thought about it as hard as you have, maybe even a little harder. I think I have been in it a little longer. What I am going to talk to you about is not a fly-by-night thing that I thought of yesterday. My thoughts were developed over a long, long time—33 years in this business. And I am not telling you, and I told General Spragins last night and General Tarpley a month ago, that I am not telling you to do what I say, but you must, however, decide because collectively we are going to tell the lieutenants in the US Army what to do. We are not going to give them options. We are going to tell them what to do. There is plenty of challenge left to them. I am not going to give specifics. We are going to tell the privates who are being trained in infantry what to do and how to do it because we at our age and with our experience and positions—if we as commanders don't do it, nobody will.

Soon I will be the Commander of TRADOC so the time has come to grasp this and move out. Now I am going to talk to you about what I developed over a long period of time—a concept of commanding and controlling infantry squads and platoons. I have applied these concepts in three different units of the US Army with varying degrees of success and completion. I originally got the concept in World War II and to just give you one indication of what led me in these directions as we were an ill-trained rabble compared to what we have in the US Army today and compared with what we ought to be but we did develop a little bit of skill just by doing it. I learned, back in those days, about fire and maneuver on a very gross scale. In my three rifle companies of the 90th Division which I commanded, I converted C Company to a basic fire company and used A & B companies for maneuver and poured 50 caliber machine guns, light machine guns, etc., into C Company until you couldn't believe it and then we went about our business. We lined C Company up on a hill and they opened fire, and A & B companies and the rest of us went to wherever they were. It worked pretty well. I applied this concept in the 2d Bn of the 8th Infantry, 4th Division, in Germany and in the 30th Infantry of the 3d Division and to the extent that I could in Vietnam with the 1st Division, but with the turnover it had to be modified and we had very

little success. I finally even modified it further and I will explain later how I did that. It is hard with the turnover you have to get things done and get it to stick with the turnover. Some battalions did much better than others. They did well enough that I am convinced that both defensive and offensive techniques are correct and have been proved in battle and in training. Let's talk about the infantry and what do we have in the rifle squads. What have we got in rifle squads? First, we have a varying number of guys who have not been around long—anywhere from 11 to 2. Neither of the two or all of the 11 have been there more than a couple of months. This is a profile of a rifle squad in peace or war. Two are about to leave, two just got there, two you are just not sure about, and two more are out mowing the grass. One thing a rifle squad is and that is a constant turmoil. They are always talking about turbulence. The rifle squad is the epitome of turbulence. That is where it all comes together. The second thing is that our system does not put the smartest people in the Army in rifle squads in the best of wars. In fact, it does the opposite. It doesn't do it on purpose. Out of 1,000 they take one guy to be the General's driver, one for a company clerk, one for signal clerk, somebody else to run this or that and what is left goes into the rifle squad. But the people who have not had the advantage and privileges of education and perhaps a family and culture, etc., they are the ones who end up in the rifle squad. They are great guys, but not very articulate. They find it very difficult to express themselves and cannot write articulate. Furthermore, they are not intellectuals. Their span of attention is not too great. The point is they are not going to sit there and concentrate on being a member of a rifle squad all day long. They are thinking about everything but that. Now, in war times it gets worse because they are scared or hungry; they are surely tired. They are always sleepy and exhausted, particularly if it is cold then they are almost in a state of exhaustion all the time. It all boils up to the point that rifle squads don't last very long. The half life of a rifle squad is a couple of months even if they haven't been in a big battle. I have been painting a picture of the raw material—of what we are working with. These are facts. We had better not have a very complicated system for that. We had better not have a sophisticated system for that. Now that is unfortunate in a way because the rifle squad is the most sophisticated military organization in the world, in anybody's Army. Why is that? It is because unlike a bomber crew, they don't have a bomber; unlike a tank crew, they don't have a tank; unlike a howitzer crew, they don't have a cannon; and unlike the radio section, they haven't got the VH radio vans. What have they got? Well, they have got an idea and so a rifle squad consists of a kind of an agreement, a common understanding by a bunch of limited guys about how they are going to go about their business. So what we have is an intellectual exercise being performed by nonintellectuals. So we have got to help them. We have got to make it a simple, clear system that doesn't require each member of the squad or the fire team leaders to be eloquent because they are not. So, yesterday we watched a squad, a couple of them, getting ready to go through an exercise and they lined up the fire teams abreast in two columns and the fire team leader was the third man back. The only reason they got where they were going was because the committee sergeant led them to where they were going. The team leader would not have had to explain to the men where to go. Well in all that, and that is all very difficult, and in combat leads to casualties. It just doesn't work. You don't do it that way. What we have to do is we have to help these kind of people. There are some very smart people that also gets into this racket and they become immediate natural leaders. But I am talking about the average. We have to help them, simplify it for them, give them concepts they understand and turn these concepts into techniques. Then it becomes a challenge for them to apply to different terrain against the enemy, at different times of day, and there is ample room for challenge. More than enough as we all know. Now, having settled with the concept, I am going to show you how

I solved the problem in the units which I mentioned and in the 8th Infantry and 30th Infantry so that they performed in training better than any other comparable unit in Europe in 1953-54 and in 1960-61 and how we did that. I am not asking you to adopt this—just to do this or something better, but be able to explain it to me, to the soldiers, to yourself. Give it the cerebral time it deserves. First let's talk about the smallest unit—the fire team, on the premise that at some point in time leaders have to lead. The leader is the first guy. The guy on the statue at the Infantry School is a fire team leader. The leader physically leads at this level. He doesn't explain things, he leads by example, etc. So the guys who are involved in his team and they may vary all the way to five to four to three to just himself and one other. It doesn't matter how many there are. The chances are you won't have five in a fire team and in combat and training you are more likely to have two, and you would be very lucky if you have three. There is an echelon to the right rear and an echelon to the left rear with five meters in between. How many more you have doesn't matter. Get them lined up with one guy on the right and one on the left. It doesn't matter who is where. It is a matter of absolute, complete indifference where the grenadier is. One on the right, one on the left, etc., but it doesn't matter. Now this fellow up here is the follow-me man, and then we put " Do as I do." Now he never has to say a word. Not a word. All he has to do is go where the squad leader tells him to go. If he goes to the right, they go to the right. If he goes to the left, then they go to the left; if he crawls, they crawl. If he shoots to the right, they shoot, if he runs in behind the barn, they all get behind the barn. He selects the route.

Fundamentally, you can teach this in AIT here. Once you start teaching this and the rest of the schedule, then the soldiers begin to understand why we have rifles, grenade launchers, and why we have radios—why we want to talk to one another and what it is all about. The infantry produces squads and platoons. Nothing else. We want to produce better ones.

If you had two of these now, you have a squad. One of the problems that you have in training is bunching up. Sergeants go kind of batty about that. Spread out. If these things are always like that, you don't have that problem. If one team follows another, that takes care of the formation unless they are told to do something else. What else do you have to know about rifle squads? The problem as to whether the squad leader is one of these fellows or just fills a notch in between, it doesn't matter. In combat he will be one of these because you never have enough. General Tarpley is going to study this and rewrite all the manuals.

You have two people talking to one another—not three and that is a great advantage. There is a fantastic advantage of having two people talking rather than three. How do these people talk to one another? Kind of in the language of the streets. Those are the orders of a squad leader in war or in training—very specific. Not what we heard yesterday—move out. Moving out doesn't mean anything. Move out where, why, how far, for what purpose, to do what next, etc. While you are moving out, what am I doing? Nobody says move out on a field of battle unless they are in an assault. Move out is not a command they would obey on the field of battle. Soldiers won't accept that in the time of war. So now we have got the problem of a few more techniques. These all take the place of orders. It is shorthand for orders. It is techniques when you are practicing and the performance is the tactics. You have to understand that they are different. (Comparison with the game of football—Washington Senators versus Dolphins.) The worse thing is that you go out and run a problem without practicing—playing your game without any practice sessions in between. These things I am talking about is the plays.

The terms I have used came from General Ham Howze. He used these terms with tank platoons. Where I first picked those terms was when he was ADC of 2d Armored back in the early 50's. He used three different terms to explain the formations. The formations of a rifle squad with two teams are precisely the same as a tank platoon with two sections. The point is that a rifle squad and a tank platoon are identical. They all have identical problems of command, controlling, understanding plays—everything. When we are a second platoon in a tank company and we are all on the ranges going from point A to point B, there is an "A" team and a "B" team and the distance is closed up so there is only five meters between them; and this is called a traveling formation. Everybody can tell by looking at a unit what is going on, how much ground it has, and where everybody is. They disperse automatically and everyone follows the leader and it is simple. We agree that the next situation is one in which you might run into the enemy but you don't know where he is and you are out in front—a lead squad platoon leader sent you off to the flank to check out a farm house, a crest of the hill, a village, etc. You don't know where the enemy is. You are moving fast. You pull the unit about so if you run into enemy fire, the enemy doesn't pin the whole rifle squad down. The distance depends on the open country or bushes. You've got to move "A" team out and ahead far enough so that the fire directed at it doesn't hit the "B" team or if it does it is scattered and inaccurate and still you can do something. You have to know how to do this. This is called a traveling overwatch. Always the rear unit is overwatching the first one and can deliver fire to help it move against the enemy, move and fire at the enemy, or move to a point to fire at the enemy. Tankers use overwatch tanks very frequently. It is a self-contained operation. It explains itself. The last formation that he used is where the lead team goes into a fire position because they know where the enemy is and they know that contact is imminent or where it has already taken place, and they go by bounds. This is called a bounding overwatch. It is clear and simple and the soldiers understand it. It uses the terrain. The traveling and the bounding overwatch take care of a lot of problems because they don't take care of a set piece of assault or a known enemy position from a line of departure that is within assaulting distance or say within 100 yards. They are perfect for patrols where you don't know where the enemy is, perfect for the actions of a squad as a part of a platoon in what you could call advance to contact, meeting engagement, movement over a long distance toward an objective, but enemy unknown. It sort of takes care of all of those. Here at Polk at the Infantry Training Center and in the 1st Infantry Training Brigade and 2d Infantry Training Brigade, you should essentially be able to produce the individuals in that team and the smart young men—the SLPP—should be qualified and understand team leadership. You should understand that thing at Fort Benning that says "Follow Me." These men should operate within a squad. The squad leader could be an instructor here. When they go through close combat lanes, it is probably better to go through in team formation with the team leader going from one to two by rushing, three to four by crawling, five to six by rushing, and seven to eight by crawling, so that everything you do will be related to all of that and kind of reenforce it. The danger of this whole thing is that you end up with a lovely collection of spare parts. You have taught them a whole lot of skills but maybe it is in relevant to what? So that somehow what I want you to figure out is to try to put a thrust through this by demonstration at the beginning and performance in the end of the squad and the platoon, and sort of see the squad and platoon because everything relates. First of all, the infantry produces infantry squads and platoons to do the mission of the Army, to fight. That organization, which is the doer of the mission, has to be clear to the soldier at that lower level so that he knows why he must help the squad—so that he knows about LAW, M16 firing, accurately navigating across country, being in good physical condition, everything on here and even race

relations relates to the team work of the squad. Everything on here is done because it contributes to the effectiveness of the squad and the platoon. If there is anything on here that doesn't, it should be taken off and eliminated on that chart. If you can't relate it to the accomplishment of the mission of the team of the squad and platoon, there is something wrong with it. It doesn't belong here at the Infantry Training Center. It belongs at the National War College or downtown high school. That is the criteria which you should use to be be [sic] able to answer that question. Now I explained last night and I won't go into great detail and for those of you who are professional infantrymen, once the squads and teams are trained like this, then the platoon leader can command his platoon knowing exactly how it is going to perform. Let's say that the platoon leader is here and it is a mile or so down to a railroad station and the platoon leader has been told to go down there because there is a report that it is occupied by an enemy. We don't know anything about the enemy except that it might be occupied. He is supposed to kill them and then come back. If that platoon leader has trained his squads, he has a very easy job on his hands. He has a rule that says that always right behind him will be a squad in the traveling formation waiting for orders—always there will be one there. In order to get this thing started, say that he has taken one of these and sent them to check out a building, check it out for anything there. He says I want you to go in traveling overwatch. If there is nothing there, I want you to rejoin me on this hill. At the same time he starts another squad—traveling overwatch—and says I will join you later and we will go on. He walks along back out of the firing line with another squad following him. The first team finds nothing. The other squad finds nothing. They go on down. (Demonstrates on drawing board.)

Once you have squads always operating in the same way, the platoon leader's job is easy. He makes the commands with no problems at all. We are not going to teach platoon leaders at Fort Polk, but the problems that you set up and the reasons for all this have to fit into the product of the infantry which is the rifle platoon. The infantryman is 100% vulnerable to the rifle. A tank is not vulnerable to all tank weapons. Almost all rifles and machine guns will defeat soldiers out to almost their maximum range if they can hit them. So then the single shot kill probability for a rifle fired at anyone in this room is high at say 100 or even 200 yards. The single shot disabling probability is higher than that. Why has the infantry not been driven from the battlefield inasmuch as it is the most vulnerable weapon we have? It is also the smartest weapon system that we have. One can survive if he is not exposed. He may be killed if he can be seen. So the infantry is still on the battlefield because it endeavors to operate without being seen—using cover and concealment. We talked a lot about that, but we are not doing enough about it. I would venture to say that men in this room have fought against Germans, Japanese, Chinese, North Koreans, Hungarians, some French—right in this room. Now how many people in this room on an average attacked an enemy or even saw the enemy—if he saw the people they were attacking. I am not going to ask you for a hand answer. But the answer is hardly ever. The enemy were not to be seen, you couldn't see them but you knew generally where they were but unhappily you didn't know specifically where they were. Yet your infantry was taking casualties, receiving fire, hearing the enemy's fire, you were putting down a base of fire and still he was firing back at you and the lead squad has taken casualties. This is tactical. That means he ran up against a garden variety-type logical defense. But that defensive position has to have two characteristics—cover and concealment. The defensive positions I saw yesterday had neither. They had overhead cover but that is not what I mean by cover. I am talking about cover from direct fire weapons—rifles, machine gun weapons, cannons, RPG's, recoilless rifles. Obviously, we don't really believe that in the US Army. We have not come to grasps with that. We are building bunkers out there with

the mouth facing the enemy. If you were facing an enemy with tanks, you would never allow one of your soldiers in one of those bunkers. A tank could sit over there at 3,000 meters and put an HE round into every one of those bunkers with the first round and kill everybody inside. Furthermore, he could see them, so they are wrong—they are 100% wrong. They will not be tolerated any more. I don't want to see any more of those. That is not right. That is the Vietnam fire base syndrome, the Special Forces syndrome, the Korean War syndrome where we had all the fire power. We can't expect to have all the fire power. Everyone has RPG's. Even the Arabs now have Russian tanks. This would make it easy for them. So, I want positions that have number one priority of natural cover and concealment. You can't always find this. You can't find it if you line everybody up on a straight line. But if you recognize a defensive position, it should look like this (Drew diagram).

Maybe if you take full advantage of every roll in the ground, trees, bushes, dig in behind a bush so that you don't destroy the bush, then most of the time you can find material for cover and concealment. If a unit continuously is unable to find material for cover and concealment, you get a new man in. Occasionally you will find that you can't, you have to cover an area and you must provide your own cover and concealment. That is what camouflage is but building a great big house with a great big mouth and putting grass on top of it is a waste of time. If you dig a hole for a couple of men, you may have to pile dirt from the hole in a berm and put the individuals' heads behind the berm. But that is not the best—that is an admission of failure. Philosophically, psychologically, and mentally, you have to say to yourself that it is wrong to make a soldier dig a hole and put his head up over the top and simply butt heads with the enemy. That is not right. They'll do it sometimes. They have to do it in the kind of bunkers I saw here. Their heads are set up there and they are like a coconut at a fair. You are just requiring them to display more bravery—save that for some other time. Give the guy a chance, give him something to put his head behind. That isn't the way our enemy fights—they don't just line up and butt heads at you. We will make enough mistakes so that our soldiers have to show that kind of bravery so let's give them a better break. Use the terrain, line up defensive positions, take trainees, have a perfect course, walk up to a point with them and tell them they are now being fired at and see what they do. Why don't we do to the enemy what they do to us. Grasp that and do what it says in the field manual. Get it out and read it. It says use cover and concealment. We construct the opposite and teach people to use it. This is an engineered murder. Now when the soldiers in the fire team, like in the attack on the fortified position I saw yesterday when the soldiers in the fire team come up on line to take up a firing position, they also, although they are not able to dig holes, are expected to take advantage of cover and concealment, to get behind trees, to get behind furrows in the ground, fire through the middle of a bush and to keep their heads down. In that exercise I saw yesterday not only did they not do it but the cadre were worse. The cadre were in combat uniform and acting as umpires instead of showing the trainees what to do. Nobody was enforcing the basic training objectives of cover and concealment.

At the close combat course there was no attempt to explain to the soldiers that the whole purpose of running from one log to the next was to minimize exposure time. You have got some safety problems. There was no effort to move from one piece of cover in any number of seconds that would give you a chance of survival. It wasn't even explained so they ran in the wrong way, held the weapon in the wrong way, squatted down behind logs, and they didn't get behind things representing trees.

In 1941, or 42 or 43, somebody in the US Army designed a course like that and it has been at the training centers ever since. The purpose of the exercise was to show a man how to move on the battlefield with minimum exposure to take advantage of cover and still deliver fire to the enemy. The purpose of that particular facility or training aid is to teach that. Now 30 years later we have the form but we lost the substance. We still have the logs, still have the weapons, still have the soldiers and still have the sergeants but we have forgotten what we are supposed to be doing. We have looked at it so often we don't see it. So many people have crawled up to the logs in the wrong way that the sand is up beyond the log so they couldn't hide behind the log if they wanted to. We are just going through the motions. Our standards of BCT are coming down to the point where we feel we must just get them through this. That isn't what we are here for. This is not what it is all about. We want to get up to that 500%.

I have been very blunt to you. I really don't mean to be rude or a smart aleck, or anything else. Everything I have said I think is important. I may not be right but I think it is so important to improve the quality of what we are doing by a magnum jump that I am asking you now to do that. I don't want you to, when I leave, to suddenly scurry around and do what I say and have a big flap. First, I would prefer that nothing happens for a while, while you think about this. I don't want any great big stirring around or panic or feeling that activity is required right now and we are going to go change everything. I want to really leave in your mind a mission of doing it better, doing it a lot better, of establishing standards and enforcing them, of making people do it again if they do it wrong, and revising that training schedule so that we have time to correct, that we insist here at the only Infantry Training Center that they do it right. Here they are going to do it right. A lot of things may have to give for you to find time to do things. Don't do things which you think are wrong. I want all of you to think it out, decide what it is you really want down in your guts, agree what is correct and then discuss it with me and then we will do it and we will contribute and save lives and have a better Army and it will take years for this to percolate all the way. There is no time to start better than now and no place better than here. Believe what you are doing, don't believe what I say. Think it out yourself. If you can improve on this thought, then act and do it yourself so that it is logical, explainable, workable with the kind of soldiers that I described.

General Tarpley and I have talked about this a lot and we think this is the direction that we should go. There is a big cross fire between the home of the infantry and the place where infantry training is taking place. Until it is done at the same place, these two elements—the infantry training school and the training center—have to work together. You have got to support them.